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Ratification and Undisclosed Principals
Arnold Rochvarg*
In the law of agency, ratification by undisclosed principals is treated differently from
ratification by disclosed or partially disclosed
principals. The generally accepted rule is that
undisclosed principals cannot ratify contracts
that their agents have entered into on their
behalf. After analyzing the rights and liabilities of undisclosed principals on authorized
transactions, the rights of disclosed and partially disclosed principals to ratify unauthorized transactions, as well as analyzing various
policy considerations, the author concludes
that the traditional arguments derived from
these areas are not sulficient to ground a rule
precluding ratification by undisclosed principals. The author concludes that ratification
by undisclosed principals should be allowed.

Le droit du mandat en commol/law traite la
ratification par un mandant non divulgue difieremment de celie d'un mandant divulguc
ou partiellement divulgue. II est generalement accepte que Ie mandant non divulguc
ne peut ratifier un contrat conclu en sa faveur
par Ie mandataire. L'auteur analyse les droits
et responsabilites du mandant non divulguc
a I'occasion d'operations autorisees ainsi que
'Ies droits du mandant divulgue ou partiellement divulgue lors d'operations excedanl
les Iimites du mandat. II etudie aussi certaines considerations de politique judiciaire.
L'auteur conclut que les arguments traditionnellement invoques dans ces domaines ne
peuvent sulfire ajustifier la regie qui veut que
Ie mandant non divulgue ne puisse ratifier
un contrat fait en sa faveur. et qu'en consequence une telle ratification devrait etre
permise.

'Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D.,
George Washington University School of Law, The author would like to thank Mark A. Sargent,
Robert H, Lande, and Joan Ardery for their comments on an earlier draft of this article; Virginia
Baskin Kass for research assistance; and the University of Baltimore Educational Foundation
for financial assistance.
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I.

Introduction

In the law of agency, ratification by undisclosed principals is treated
differently from ratification by disclosed and partially disclosed principals.
The generally accepted rule is that undisclosed principals cannot ratify unauthorized contracts which their agents have made on their behalf Although
this rule has been accepted for almost one hundred years, the adequacy of
the reasons advanced to justify it have been rarely examined. This article
attempts to fill that void.
When a person chooses to transact business by using an agent, the
person, known as the principal, can operate either disclosed, partially disclosed or undisclosed. In the first situation, the principal is disclosed if at
the time of the transaction conducted by the agent, the other party, known
as the third party, has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and
knows the principal's identity. I The principal is partially disclosed if the
third party has notice that the agent is acting for a principal, but does not
know the principal's identity.2 Finally, the principal is undisclosed if the
third party has no notice that the agent is acting for a principaI.3 If the
IRestatement (Second) of Agency §4(1). See also: Sweitzer v. Whitehead, 404 Pa. 506, 173
A.2d 116 at 119 (1961); Resnickv. Abner B. Cohen Advertising, Inc., 104 A.2d 254 at 255 (App.
D.C. 1954); and Accinanto, Ltdv. Cosmopointan Shipping Co., 99 F. Supp. 261 at 267 (D. Md.
1951).
2Restatement (Second) ofAgency §4(2). See also: Searl v. Earll, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 151,221
F.2d 24 at 28 (1954); and In re Kaiser's Estate, 217 Wis. 4, 258 N.W. 177 at 178 (1935).
3Restatement (Second) ofAgency §4(3). See also: Hidrocarburos y Derivados, C.A. v. Lemos,
453 F. Supp. 160 at 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); and Instituto Cubano de Estabilizacion del AZllcar
v. The S.S. Theotokos, 155 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

1989]

RATIFICATION AND UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPALS

289

principal has authorized his agent to enter a contract with the third party,
the principal is liable to the third party regardless of whether the principal
is disclosed, partially disclosed or undisclosed. 4 Moreover, whether the principal is disclosed, partially disclosed or undisclosed does not change the
principal's right to enforce against the third party a contract which the principal authorized his agent to make,S except in a few circumstances. 6 These
rules governing authorized contracts have often been described as
anomalous7 in that a third party is equally bound to a principal to whom
he did not expect to be bound as he is to a principal to whom he did expect
to be bound. Although at times criticized, these rules, which treat undisclosed principals almost identically to disclosed and partially disclosed principals in their ability to enforce and be held liable on contracts which they
have authorized their agents to make, are nevertheless widely accepted. 8
4Restatement (Second) ofAgency §§144, 186 and 188. See also: Small v. CIAO Stables, Inc.,
289 Md. 554,425 A.2d 1030 at 1033 (1981); United States v. Everett Monte Cristo Hotel, Inc.,
524 F.2d 127 at 140 (9th Cir. 1975); and United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Coastal Service,
Inc., 103 Ga. App. 133, 118 S.E.2d 710 at 713 (1961).
SRestatement (Second) of Agency §§292 and 302. See also: Quick Erectors, Inc. v. Seattle
Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351 at 356 (E.D. Mo. 1981); and HillbrookApts, Inc. v. Nyce Crete
Co., 237 Pa. Super. 565, 352 A.2d 148 at 154 (1975).
6For situations where the contract specifically excludes the undisclos!!d principal, see: Res·
tatement (Second) ofAgency §189; and Mitchell v. Locurto, 79 Cal. App. 2d 507, 179 P.2d 848
at 851 (1947). For sealed instruments, see: Restatement (Second) ofAgency §191. But see: W.A.
Seavey, "The Rationale of Agency" (1920) 29 Yale L.J. 859 at 880 [hereinafter "Seavey"] (rule
is due to timidity of courts and there is no reason for it). See also: J.B. Ames, "Undisclosed
Principal - His Rights and Liabilities" (1909) 18 Yale L.J. 443 at 452 [hereinafter "Ames"];
and W. MUller-Freienfels, "The Undisclosed Principal" (1953) 16 Mod. L. Rev. 299 at 304
[hereinafter "Miiller-Freienfels"). For negotiable instruments, see: Restatement (Second) of
Agency §192; Uniform Commercial Code §403(2)(b); Britton v. Mitchell, 361 F.2d 922 at 925
(10th Cir. 1966); and Lady v. Thomas, 38 Cal. App. 2d 688, 102 P.2d 396 (1940). For contracts
involving a personal trust or confidence in the agent, see: A.T. Wright, "Undisclosed Principal
In California" (1919) 5 Cal. L. Rev. 183 at 188 [hereinafter "Wright"); A.L. Goodhart & C.J.
Hamson, "Undisclosed Principals In Contract" (1932) 4 Cambridge L.J. 320 at 356 [hereinafter
"Goodhart & Hamson"); Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Higgins, 117 Ark. 372,174 S.W. 1150
(1915); and Kelley v. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522, 15 S.W. 62 (1891). For contracts where the third
party would have refused to deal with the undisclosed principal had his identity been known,
see: Restatement (Second) ofAgency §304. See also: Note, "Personal Prejudice and the Doctrine
of the Undisclosed Principal" (1930) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1271 at 1273-74; and W.A. Seavey,
"Undisclosed Principals; Unsettled Problems" (1955) 1 How. L.J. 79 at 79.
7See O.W. Holmes, "The History of Agency" in Association of American Law Schools, ed.,
Select Essays in Anglo·American Legal History, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown,1909) 368 at 404.
See also: Ames, ibid. at 443; W.D. Lewis, "The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal In
Contract" (1909) 9 Colum. L. Rev. 116 at 118 [hereinafter "Lewis"); Note, (1887) 3 L. Q. Rev.
358; Wright, ibid. at 183; Goodhart & Hamson, ibid. at 356; and Miiller-Freienfels, ibid. at
311.
SIn 1785, Lord Mansfield wrote that the rule that undisclosed principals could sue third
parties who had contracted with their agents was "long settled": Rabone v. Williams, [1785)
7 T.R. 360, cited in O.W. Holmes, "Agency" (1891) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at 19 [hereinafter
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If a principal's agent makes a contract with a third party without prior
authority, the principal is not bound to the contract. The principal is not
liable on the contract, and concomitantly cannot enforce it against the third
party. The principal, however, may decide to ratify the unauthorized contract. By ratifying the contract, the principal retroactively authorizes the
agent and thus becomes bound to the agreement. 9 By ratifying the unauthorized contract, the principal accepts liability and gains enforcement rights
against the third party.l0 Although ratification has also been criticized as
creating an anomaly, in this case because a principal is allowed to enter into
and enforce a contract which he authorized only after it was originally
made,11 the doctrine of ratification is widely accepted. 12
Unlike the situations involving authorized contracts, undisclosed principals are treated differently from disclosed and partially disclosed principals
regarding ratification of unauthorized contracts. The generally accepted rule
is that undisclosed principals do not have the power to ratify unauthorized
contracts which their agents make on their behalf. 13 Therefore, although
disclosed and partially disclosed principals can enforce and be held liable
on unauthorized contracts by ratifying them, undisclosed principals cannot.
No rights or liabilities can be created for the undisclosed principals by
ratification.
The purpose of this article is to analyze whether the rule which denies
undisclosed principals the power to ratify unauthorized contracts which
their agents make on their behalf should continue to be accepted, or whether
"Holmes"). See also: Ames, supra, note 6 at 443 (doctrine that undisclosed principal may SUIl
and be sued upon contracts made by his agent is so firmly established in England and the
United States that it would be "quixotic" to attack it); and Lewis, ibid. at 119 (doctrine is as
"old as the Year Books", citing E.W. Huffcutt, The Law 0/Agency Including the Law a/Principal
and Agent and the Law a/Master and Servant, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown 1901) c.lO at 158
[hereinafter Huffcut on Agency]).
9Restatement (Second) a/Agency §82, 143. See also: C&K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
0/America, 537 E Supp. 480 at 495 (W.D. Pa. 1982); and Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency,
Inc., 463 E Supp. 27 at 32 (D.S.C. 1978).
IOSee generally, ER. Mechem, "The Effect of Ratification As Between the Principal and the
Other Party" (1906) 4 Mich. L. Rev. 269 [hereinafter "Mechem"].
•
IISee Holmes, supra, note 8 at 14 (opposition of common sense intensified by additional
absurdities introduced by ratification); E.C. Goddard, "Ratification By An Undisclosed Prin·
cipal" (1903) 2 Mich. L. Rev. 25 at 40 [hereinafter "Goddard"]; Note, (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev.
343 at 344; and Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 289
Ky. 159, 158 S.W.2d 437 at 439 (1942).
12Ratification has been referred to as being even older than the Year Books. See E. Warn baugh,
"A Problem As To Ratification" (1895) 9 Harv. L. Rev. 60 at 60 n.l [hereinafter "Wambaugh"].
13Reporter's Notes to Restatement (Second) 0/ Agency §85 (although there was some early
disagreement, it is now "almost universally" agreed that there can be ratification only if the
agent purported to act for another). See also: D.J. Hill, "Some Problems of the Undisclosed
Principal" (1967) J. Bus. L. 122 at 129 (rule is "well established"); and infra, notes 41·44.
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it should be rejected in order to make the rule consistent with other areas
of the law of agency. Consideration will be given to whether the theories
which have been offered by various theorists over the last one hundred years
to explain other areas of agency law in some way compel a conclusion about
the power of undisclosed principals to ratify unauthorized contracts. No
attempt will be made to harmonize the various theories; rather, each will
be evaluated on its own merits as a possible source of support for a rule
involving ratification by undisclosed principals. Even those theories whose
merits have been challenged elsewhere will be treated as worthy of analysis,
since an analysis of all possible theories of agency law must be considered
before one can properly suggest that an established rule, such as that involving an undisclosed principal's ability to ratify, should be changed.
The article is structured as follows. First, it will describe the history of
the rule and the current state of authority beginning with the landmark case
of Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant,14 which is generally considered to
have established the ratification rule for undisclosed principals. In Part III,
the article then will analyze whether the rule denying undisclosed principals
the power to ratify can be supported by the theories which have been offered
to explain why undisclosed principals are held liable and can enforce authorized contracts. This analysis w~ll show that, for the most part, the law
involving undisclosed principals and authorized contracts does not support
the rule denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify, but rather one
which permits ratification. Part IV will analyze whether any of the theories
concerning ratification by disclosed and partially disclosed principals support the rule denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify. Once again,
the conclusion reached is that for the most part, the law of ratification does
not require a rule denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify, but
rather provides greater support for permitting ratification. The article will
then consider other arguments which might justify the current rule such as
whether undisclosed principals should be discouraged and whether ratification should be discouraged. This analysis will also fail to provide support
for the current rule denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify, and
will support a rule permitting ratification. Finally, the article will argue that
although the· rule denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify is the
view of the majority oflegal participants, courts should not be unwilling to
adopt a position to the contrary because there is no reliance on the old rule
and because this new position is more theoretically consistent with other
theories of agency law.
14[1900-3] All E.R. 40, [1901] A.C. 240, 70 LJ.K.B. 662 (H.L.) [hereinafter Keighley, Maxsted
cited to All E.R.].
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II. The Current Law and Its Genesis
A. The Landmark Case
The 1901 decision of England's highest judicial body, the House of
Lords, in Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant ("Keighley, Maxsted"), is the
landmark case which established that undisclosed principals cannot ratify
contracts. Keighley, Maxsted considered only whether an undisclosed principal could be held liable on a contract which, it was alleged, it had previously ratified; however, it is also the landmark case for denying undisclosed
principals the right to enforce contracts based on ratification. It is interesting
that a rule which is generally viewed as denying undisclosed principals a
right enjoyed by other principals was developed in a case not involving
rights of undisclosed principals, but their liabilities. This distinction between
denying rights and denying liabilities was not made by the House of Lords
in Keighley, M axsted, and has not been made by any other court. This
distinction should be important, however, as this article will suggest in its
analysis of the issue.
To understand the historical background of the rule denying undisclosed
principals the power to ratify, this section will present (1) a short discussion
of the facts in Keighley, Maxsted, (2) a discussion ofthe decision by England's
intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeal, and (3) the decision of
the House of Lords.
Keighley, Maxsted & Co. ("principal") authorized Roberts ("agent") to
purchase wheat at a specified price. The agent was unable to obtain the
wheat at the authorized price, but he contracted nevertheless with Durant
& Co. ("third party") for wheat at a higher price. The agent did not disclose
to the third party that he was representing a principal, and the contract was
signed by the agent in his own name. When the agent informed his principal
of the transaction, the principal agreed to the contract and instructed its
agent to arrange for delivery. Before the time for delivery, the price of wheat
dropped and the third party was told that the deal was off. The third party
sued the principal seeking recovery for damages it suffered when it sold the
wheat at a price lower than the price provided in the first contract with the
agent. The third party's theory of recovery against the principal was that its
instructions to the agent to arrange for delivery constituted the principal's
ratification of the contract, thus making the principal liable for damages.
After proof of these facts at trial, the trial judge directed a verdict for the
principal based on the view that since the agent had not professed to act
on behalf of a principal, ratification was not possible. ls
ISDurant & Co. v. Roberts and Keighley, Maxsted & Co., [1900] 1 Q.B. 629 at 630 (C.A.).
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On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the directed verdict was reversed
and a new trial was ordered. 16 In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal
primarily relied upon two rules: (1) that ratification is "equivalent to a prior
command",17 and (2) that undisclosed principals can enforce and be held
liable on contracts which the principal authorizes the agent to make when
authority is given prior to the agent's signing the contract with the third
party. IS Lord Collins ofthe Court of Appeal reasoned that ifthere was prior
authority, it would be of no consequence whether the agent disclosed the
principal, and since ratification was equivalent to prior authority, it should
be of no consequence for ratification ifthere was any disclosure by the agent
of his principal. 19
The Court of Appeal's ruling was reversed unanimously by the House
of Lords. 2o Each of the eight Law Lords wrote separate opinions. The Earl
of Halsbury wrote that there was no precedent for permitting ratification
in this case. Nor did he find relevant that undisclosed principals can sue
and be sued on authorized contracts. To permit ratification in this case would
create a contract different than the one actually made. 21 Lord MacNaghten
also relied on precedent writing that "there is a stream of authority all
tending in one direction" against permitting ratificationP In regard to the
argument that there was no case actually on point, he replied that "the
clearer a thing is, the more difficult it is to find any express authority or
any dictum exactly to the point."23 He also viewed the Court of Appeal's
decision as contrary to "common sense, whatever that expression means". 24
In general, only parties to a contract could sue or be sued on a contract.
Ratification was an exception to this general rule, but since ratification was
based on a fiction that the principal is deemed to be the other contracting
party, the fiction would not cover the case of an agent who contracted on
behalf of an undisclosed principal. Ratification, therefore, should not be
extended to undisclosed principals because undisclosed intentions do not
create civil obligations.25

16Ibid. See also the annotations in (1900) 16 T.L.R. 244; 44 S.J. 291 (March 10, 1900); (1900)
The Weekly Notes 54; and Recent Cases (1900) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 153.
17Ibid. at 651 per Parke B., citing Foster v. Bates (1843), 12 M. & W. 233.
18Ibid. at 659.
19Ibid.
20Supra, note 14.
2lIbid. at 43.
22Ibid.
23Ibid., directly quoting Panama & South Pacific Telegraph Co. v. India Rubber, Gutta-Percha,
& Telegraph Works Co. (1875), L.R. Ch. App. 515 at 526 per James L.J..
24Ibid. at 44.
2sIbid.
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Lord Shand also agreed that the Court of Appeal should be reversed.
The only contract actually made was between the agent and the third party.
To allow ratification by an undisclosed principal "would be to give one of
two contracting parties in his option, merely from what was passing in his
own mind, and not disclosed, the power of saying that the contract was his
alone, or a contract in which others were bound to him. "26
Lord Davey first discussed earlier cases which he believed supported a
view contrary to the Court of Appeal's decision. He then addressed the
argument that because undisclosed principals can enforce authorized contracts, they should be able to ratify unauthorized ones. Lord Davey disagreed. He wrote that there is a "wide difference between an agency existing
at the date of the contract, which is susceptible of proof', and "an intention
locked up in the mind of the contractor, which he may either abandon or
act on his own pleasure, and the ascertainment of which involves an inquiry
into the state of his mind at the date of the contract. "27 That undisclosed
principals can enforce authorized contracts is itself an anomaly, and to
permit undisclosed principals to ratify would "be adding another anomaly
to the law, and not correcting an anomaly".28
Lord James of Hereford was also concerned about relying upon the
agent's undisclosed intentions. He disagreed that a man's thoughts, unexpressed and unrecorded, could form the basis of a contract. 29 Lord Brampton
voted to reverse the Court of Appeal because an "essential element of a
contract" was "concurrence of intention".3o To give weight to a "reserved
intention" would "open wide a doorway to fraud and deception; and it
would necessitate the addition of the doubtful science of thought-reading
to the requirements ofa mercantile education."3! A new contract would be
required to create liability for the undisclosed principal in this case. 32 Lord
Robertson's belief that the "whole hypothesis of ratification is that the ultimate ratifier is already in appearance the contractor", left no room for
ratification unless the principal's credit had been pledged to the third party. 33
Lord Lindley first addressed undisclosed principals and authorized contracts. Undisclosed principals are allowed to sue and be sued on authorized
contracts because "effect is given ... to what is true in fact, although that
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
3lIbid.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.

at 46.
at 48.
at 49.
at 50.
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truth may not have been known to the other contracting party". 34 Although
an anomaly exists in holding someone bound to someone of whom he knows
nothing, agents are common and useful in business transactions and in most
cases it would not have mattered to the third party that an undisclosed
principal existed. Ratification aims to give effect to the real intentions of
both contracting parties. However, to permit undisclosed principals to ratify
would be extending this goal too far.
As can be seen by this summary of the eight opinions, there was no
one reason common to the different opinions written by the judges. 35 Yet,
four arguments do seem to characterize accurately the House of Lords decision. First, the House of Lords rejected the argument that because undisclosed principals can enforce authorized contracts, they should be allowed
to ratify unauthorized ones. Allowing undisclosed principals to enforce authorized contracts would be "itself an anomaly",36 and it would not be
desirable to expand the rights of undisclosed principals any further. Second,
the House of Lords expressed concern that to permit ratification by undisclosed principals would "open wide a doorway to fraud and deception'?7
because proof of ratification in part would be based on the agent's undisclosed intentions. Third, the House of Lords expressed the view that the
"whole hypothesis of ratification is that the ultimate ratifier is already in
appearance the contractor",38 and therefore, there is "no room"39 for someone who has not appeared previously to be granted a power of ratification.
Fourth, the House of Lords relied on other cases it previously had decided,
although none presented the precise issue involved in Keighley, Maxsted. 40
The final result of these opinions was that the third party was not able to
collect any damages from the principal.

B. The Restatement
The Restatement (Second) ofAgency has a few sections which conform
to the House of Lords' decision in Keighley, Maxsted. Section 82 defines
ratification as the affirmation by a person of a prior act which was "done
or professedly done on his account". Section 84( 1), in discussing what acts
can be ratified, defines these acts as those which could have been authorized
by a "purported principal". Section 85( 1) provides that ratification does not
34Ibid. at 51.
3sOpinions were written by The Earl of Halsbury, Lord MacNaghten, Lord Shand, Lord
James of Hereford, Lord Davey, Lord Brampton, Lord Robertson, and Lord Lindley.
36Supra, note 14 at 47.
37 Ibid. at 50.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
4OIbid. at 43.
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result unless the agent "purported to be acting for the ratifier". One explanation for these rules, as provided in the comment to Section 85(1), is that
ratification gives the third party what he expected when he made the contract
with the agent. Since the third party does not expect a contract with any
principal when the principal is undisclosed, there is no reason for
ratification.
C.

Case Law

The Reporter's Notes to Section 85 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency state that the requirement of ratification that an agent purport to
act for another is "almost universally" followed. An examination ofthe case
law supports this observation. The Keighley, Maxsted decision and Restatement position is the majority view in the United States,41 although there
4lSee, e.g.: Alaska, Pullen v. Dale, 109 E2d 538 (9th Cir. 1940); Arkansas, Runyan v. Community Fund, 182 Ark. 441, 31 S.W.2d 743 (1930); Arizona, Fainvay Builders, Inc. v. Malouf
Towers Rental Co., 124 Ariz. 242, 603 P.2d 513 (1979); California, Rakestraw v. Rodrigues,
104 Cal. Rptr. 57, 8 Cal. 3d 67, 500 P.2d 1401 (1972); Colorado, Nunnally v. Hilderman, 150
Colo. 363, 373 P.2d 940 (1962); Connecticut, Cye/one Fence Co. v. McAviney, 121 Conn. 656,
186 A. 635 (1936); Delaware, Hirzel Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co., 46 Del. 334,
83 A.2d 700 (1950); District of Columbia, Lewis v. Washington Metro Area Transit Allth., 463
A.2d 666 (D.C. 1983); Georgia, Healthdyne, Inc. v. Odom, 173 Ga. App. 184,325 S.E.2d 847
(1984); Kansas, Schra/t v. Leis, 236 Kan. 28, 686 P.2d 865 (1984); Idaho, Linn v. Alameda
Mining and Mill, Co., 17 Idaho 45, 104 P. 668 (1909); Illinois, Albin Karetzkis v. Cosmopolitan
Nat'l Bank, 37 III. App.2d 484, 186 N.E.2d 72 (1962); Indiana, Bryan v. Pommert, 110 Ind.
App. 61, 37 N.E.2d 720 (1941); Iowa,Anita Valley, Inc. v. Bingley, 279 N.W.2d 37 (Iowa, 1979)
Kentucky, Capurso v. Johnson, 248 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1952); Louisiana, Bamber Contractors,
Inc. v. Morrison Eng'g & Contracting Co., 385 So.2d 327 (La. 1980); Maryland, Hammond v.
Du Bois, 131 Md. 116, 101 A. 612 (1917); Massachusetts, Wedgwood v. Eastern Comm. Travelers
Accident Ass'n, 308 Mass. 463, 32 N.E.2d 687 (1941); Michigan, Gandy v. Cole, 35 Mich. App.
695, 193 N.W.2d 58 (1971); Minnesota, Gran v. City o/St. Paul Board o/Education, 274 Minn.
220,143 N.W.2d 246 (1966); Mississippi, GulfRefining Co. v. Travis, 201 Miss. 336, 30 So.2d
398 (1947); Missouri, Flemingv. Anderson, 232 S.W. 718 (Mo. 1921); Nebraska, General Credit
Corp. v. Moore, 128 Neb. 881,260 N.W. 368 (1935); Nevada, Harrah v. Specialty Shops, Inc.,
67 Nev. 493, 221 P.2d 398 (1950); New Hampshire, Ernshaw v. Roberge, 86 N.H. 451, 170 A.
7 (1934); New Jersey, Gold/arb v. Reicher, 112 N.J. 413,171 A. 149, afJ'd, 113 N.J. 399, 174
A. 507 (1934); New Mexico, Ullibarri Landscaping Materials, Inc. v. Colony Material, Inc., 97
N.M. 266, 639 P.2d 75 (1981); New York, O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 159 Misc. 920,289
N.Y.S. 252 (1936); North Carolina, Wright v. County 0/Macon, 64 N.C. App. 718, 308 S.E.2d
97 (1983); North Dakota, Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Wood, 301 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1980); Ohio,
Valaske v. Wirtz, 106 E2d 450 (6th Cir. 1939); Oklahoma, Pettit v. Vogt, 495 P.2d 395 (Okla.
1972); Oregon, Southern Oregon Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Patridge, 71 Or. App. 53, 691 P.2d 135
(1984); Pennsylvania, DeSilvio v. Restauire, 264 Pa. 528, 400 A.2d 211 (1979); Rhode Island,
Kesselman v. Mid-States Freight Lines, 78 R.I. 518, 82 A.2d 881 (1951); South Carolina, Brazell
Bros. Contractors v. Hill, 245 S.C. 69, 138 S.E.2d 835 (1964); South Dakota, Minder & Jorgenson
and Co. v. Brustuen, 24 S.D. 537, 124 N.W. 723 (1910); Texas, Rhodes, Inc. v. Duncan, 623
S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); Utah, Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982); Vermont, Templeton Constr'n Co. v. Kelly, 130 Vt. 420, 296 A.2d 242 (1972); Washington, Atlas
Bldg Supply Co., v. First Independent Bank, 15 Wash. App. 367, 550 P.2d 26 (1976); and
Wisconsin, Spivey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 79 Wis.2d 58, 255 N.W.2d 469 (1977).
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are several decisions which do not follow it.42 This rule is consistently followed in Canada43 and in England. 44
III. A Ratification Rule for Undisclosed Principals based on the Liability
and Rights of Undisclosed Principals in Authorized Transactions
As discussed above, this article considers whether the rule denying
undisclosed principals the power to ratify unauthorized contracts deserves
continued acceptance in light of the consistency of the rule with other doctrines of agency law involving undisclosed principals. The first step in this
analysis is to ascertain whether the rule denying undisclosed principals the
power to ratify unauthorized contracts is consistent with the rules governing
undisclosed principals' liability and rights on authorized contracts. This
approach is not unprecedented. Both the Court of Appeal and House of
Lords in Keighley, Maxsted discussed how the rules involving undisclosed
principals and authorized contracts impacted on the rule involving undisclosed principals and ratification of unauthorized contracts. This section,
therefore, will discuss the various theories which have been offered over the
years to explain why undisclosed principals are liable on contracts which
they authorize their agents to make with third parties, and why undisclosed
principals are given the right to enforce such contracts against third parties.
It is interesting to note that most ofthese theories were suggested by writers
at the end of the nineteenth century or at the beginning of the twentieth
century who were concerned with explaining agency law in terms consistent
with other areas of the common law such as contracts, torts and trusts.
These theorists were in part troubled by the "fictions" which they saw as
the foundation of agency law. 45 They especially found troublesome the rules
42The leading case expressing the contrary view is Allen v. Liston Lumber Co., 281 Mass.
440, 183 N.E. 747 (1933). For additional support, see: Moynough v. Empress Gold Mining Co.,
6 Cal. App. 2d 674, 44 P.2d 659 (1935) (undisclosed principal held liable based on ratification).
See also Antar v. Trans World Airlines, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 355 (1970).
43See, e.g.: Begley v. Imperial Bank of Canada, [1936] 2 W.W.R. 243 at 250, [1936] 2 All
E.R. 367, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.); Eckroydv. Rodgers, [1913] 23 Man. R. 633; [1913] 4 W.W.R.
601, [1913] 24 W.L.R.318, 11 D.L.R. 626; Eastern Construction Co. v. National Trust Co.(l913),
[1914] A.C. 197, 15 D.L.R. 755 (P.C.); McCallum v. Cohoe, [1918] 44 O.L.R. 497; National
Securities Ltd v. Darling, [1927] 1 W.W.R. 413 (Alta. Dist. Ct.); and Canadian Encyclopedic
Digest (Ont. Ed.), Vol. 1, Title 4, Part III, Ratification of Agency §§34, 35 and 169.
44See, e.g.: Baker v. Barclays Bank, Ltd, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 822, 99 S.J. 491, [1955] 2 All E.R.
571; A.L. Undenvood, Ltd v. Bank ofLiverpool, [1924] 1 K.B. 775; Greenwood v. Martins Bank,
Ltd, [1931] 1 K.B. 371; Hepburn v. A. Tomlinson (Haulers), Ltd, [1966] A.C. 451, [1966] 2
W.L.R. 453, 1 All E.R. 418 (H.L.); and Woolett v. Minister ofAgriculture (1954), [1955] I Q.B.
103, [1954] 3 W.L.R. 776, [1954] 3 All E.R. 529.
4sHolmes, supra, note 8 at 14 (agency law is the result of conflict between logic and good
sense - one side striving to carry fictions out to consistent results, the other restraining that
effort when the results become too manifestly unjust).
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involving undisclosed principals. Today's view of agency law as an independent body of law not dependent on the law of contracts, torts or trusts
resolves the tensions with which these theorists struggled. These older theories, however, still require our attention because they attempt to explain
the "true" basis of agency law. Moreover, the Keighley, Maxsted decision
was rendered during this period in which the great debates on agency law
were being made by scholars such as Holmes, Ames, Lewis, Mechem, Huffcut and Wambaugh. Although the Law Lords did not rely on any of these
commentaries, they were also attempting to understand the underlying foundation of all agency law. A brief analysis of these theories is therefore especially appropriate.

A.

Theories Explaining the Liability of Undisclosed Principals on
Authorized Contracts

An evaluation of the literature indicates there are seven theories which
have been presented to explain why undisclosed principals are liable on
contracts which they authorize their agents to make. These theories might
be useful in reaching a rule concerning undisclosed principals and ratification of unauthorized contracts. These theories are (1) the benefit-burden
theory, (2) the tort theory, (3) the indemnification theory, (4) the assignment
theory, (5) the identity theory, (6) the change of position theory, and (7) the
independent agency law theory. Because there is some overlap between the
theories, and because some may even conflict, this section will evaluate each
theory independently. Although most have been criticized, this article initially will assume their continued validity in order to understand their consequences on ratification. Subsequent analysis of their weaknesses, however,
will enable us to evaluate their usefulness as a foundation for a new rule of
ratification.
1.

Benefit-Burden Theory

The benefit-burden theory was suggested by early theorists such as Huffcut,46 Ames,47 and Lewis,48 as the basis of undisclosed principals' liability
on authorized contracts. According to these scholars, undisclosed principals
are liable on authorized contracts because as the party receiving the benefit
of the contract, they should bear the burden of the obligations of the contract
46HujJcut on Agency, supra, at §162.
47Ames, supra, note 6 at 447.
48Lewis, supra, note 7 at 119. See also, E.J. Weinrib, "The Undisclosed Principle of Un disclosed Principals" (1975) 21 McGill L.J. 298 at 298 [hereinafter "Weinrib"]; Comind, Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. oj United Tech. Corp., 116 ER.D. 397 (D. Conn.
1987); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 E Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); and First Nat'l Bank v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 6 E2d 339 (8th Cir. 1925).
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agreed to by the agent. As in any contractual situation, each bargaining side
agrees that in return for a benefit which it desires to receive from the other
party, it will suffer a burden. For example, the benefit to the buyer of wheat
is the receipt of the wheat; the burden is the payment of money. This benefit
and burden, of course, is reversed for the seller. In the agency situation, if
the undisclosed principal is to receive the "benefit" (the wheat), he should
be required to pay the "burden", and thus should be held liable to the seller
for the fulfillment of the agreement.
If the benefit-burden theory is an accurate explanation of undisclosed
principals' liability on authorized contracts, this tends to support a rule
permitting undisclosed principals to be held liable on unauthorized contracts
based on ratification. If the undisclosed principal, after learning of all the
material facts of an unauthorized deal, decides to accept the benefits of the
transaction, and instructs his agent to transmit the benefits to him, the
undisclosed principal should be held liable, and this liability could be based
on ratification.
It would be premature, however, to conclude that a rule permitting
ratification by undisclosed principals must be adopted merely because it is
consistent with the benefit-burden theory of an undisclosed principal's liability. The benefit-burden theory cannot by itself support a major change
in the ratification doctrine due to a significant weakness: it does not explain
the liability of undisclosed principals on authorized executory contracts
where no benefit has been received. 49 For example, if the undisclosed principal breaches his agreement to pay for goods before delivery, he has received
no benefit, yet he can be held liable for damages resulting from his breach.
Ratification cases may also involve executory contracts. For example, in
Keighley, Maxsted, the undisclosed principal had received no benefit from
the wheat contract, but the basis of its liability was argued to be ratification
based on the principal's instructions to the agent to arrange for delivery.

In summary, therefore, where ratification of an unauthorized contract
is based on acceptance of benefits, the benefit-burden theory is more consistent with a rule contrary to Keighley, Maxsted and the Restatement. Its
deficiency with regard to explaining executory contracts, however, limits its
ability to be the sole support for a rule change.

49See Lewis, supra, note 7 at 124.
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Tort Theory

The "tort" theory was discussed by Lewis in his 1909 Columbia Law
Review article. 50 Lewis explains the liability of undisclosed principals on
authorized contracts as arising from the undisclosed principals' wrongful
deceit of third parties. The third party has been deceived into believing that
there is no one other than the agent. The person responsible for this misimpression, the undisclosed principal, should be held liable as a result of
his deceit. If this tort theory is a proper explanation for the liability of
undisclosed principals in authorized transactions, the ratification rule most
consistent with it is that undisclosed principals be held liable on unauthorized contracts based on ratification. The reasoning is as follows. The
undisclosed principal's "deceit" is his not disclosing his existence. The degree or type of deceit achieved by the undisclosed principal is not dependent
on whether his agent acts with or without authority. As a consequence, in
these situations where the agent has been instructed not to disclose his
principal's existence, but the contract signed by the agent and the third party
is beyond the authority previously granted to the agent, the "deceit" must
necessarily be equal to the "deceit" involved in an authorized transaction;
the "tort" of non-disclosure exists in both cases. Therefore, it should make
no difference whether the agent acted with or without prior authority if
liability is based on a deceit theory. The undisclosed principal should be
held liable in both instances.
Again, however, simple reliance on a tort theory is too slim a reed to
support a change in a doctrine with such wide acceptance as the present
rule for undisclosed principals and ratification. The tort theory has a major
drawback: it may not be deceitful for a principal to remain undisclosed.
Undisclosed principals are very common, and thus no third party can reasonably argue that he was deceived into believing that none existed merely
because the agent did not identify his principaI.51 The popUlarity of the
practice of undisclosed principals weakens the argument that such actions
constitute deceit which can then provide the basis for the liability of undisclosed principals on authorized contracts. Therefore, the tort-deceit theory cannot adequately justify undisclosed principals' liability on authorized
contracts, and as a result, it cannot be relied upon as the sole foundation
for a rule permitting undisclosed principals the power to ratify.

SOIbid.
SISee Goodhart & Hamson, supra, note 6 at 344; Anchor Warehouse Co. v. Mead, 181 S.W.
1057 at 1059 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916); and Quick Erectors. Inc. v. Seattle Bronze Corp., supra,
note 5 at 356.
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Indemnification Theory

An indemnification theory has also been discussed by commentatorsS2
as the basis of undisclosed principals' liability on authorized contracts. This
theory posits that by authorizing their agents to contract with third parties,
undisclosed principals are in fact contracting with their agents that if there
are any liabilities suffered by the agent, the principal will be liable. The
indemnification theory maintains moreover that third parties gain the right
to hold undisclosed principals liable on the contract because third parties
become subrogated to the agents' rights against principals. According to this
view, the liability of an undisclosed principal on an authorized contract is
viewed as arising out of the principal's obligation to his agent, not out of
any obligation of the principal to the third party. The right of the agent
against his principal is in tum permitted to be enforced by the third party.
Acceptance of the indemnification theory as the proper basis of an
undisclosed principal's liability to a third party on an authorized contract
most likely supports a rule which permits undisclosed principals to ratify
unauthorized contracts. This is the case because it is quite reasonable to
view the act of ratification by the principal as an act of indemnification for
the liability which the agent has incurred or will incur on account of the
contract. If the agent has acted without authority, the principal would be
under no obligation to indemnify his agent. In fact, the principal might have
a cause of action against the agent for breach of the fiduciary duty to act
only as authorized. But, by ratifying the unauthorized act, the principal is
retroactively authorizing his agent, and thus the act of ratification constitutes
a waiver of the principal's cause of action against the agent for breach of
fiduciary duty. S3 A rule that permits undisclosed principals to ratify unauthorized contracts, therefore, would be consistent with the undisclosed principal's liability on authorized contracts as explained under the indemnification theory.
But, as in the cases of the benefit-burden and tort theories, the indemnification theory may be too limited in its explanation of an undisclosed
principal's liability on authorized contracts for it to be the springboard for
a new rule involving undisclosed principals and ratification. The limitation
exists in that the indemnification theory is dependent upon the agent having
suffered a burden from the contract. However, relying solely on the indemnification theory, if the agent has not suffered any burden, then the agent
would have no rights against his principal to which the third party can be
S2See Seavey, supra, note 6 at 879; and Ames, supra, note 6 at 449.
S3Restatement (Second) ofAgency §416. See also: Brooks v. January, 321 N.W.2d 823 at 829
(Mich. App. 1982); Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Northland Bldg Corp., 542 S.W.2d 436 at 450
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976); and Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, supra, note 41 at 1405.
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subrogated. Thus, the third party would have no right to proceed against
the principal, a right which would be present in the unauthorized case. This
result, however, is probably not correct. If the agent, for example, becomes
bankrupt after an authorized transaction, the third party still is able to hold
the undisclosed principal liable even though the agent has no rights against
the principal. The third party is given rights directly against the undisclosed
principal without any need to go through the agent. This shows that the
liability of an undisclosed principal on an authorized contract may be based
on a direct right of the third party against the undisclosed principal. Such
a direct, independent right is not recognized by the indemnification theory.
For this reason, the indemnification theory does not fully explain the liability
of undisclosed principals on authorized contracts. This deficiency limits its
ability to support a ratification rule for undisclosed principals on unauthorized contracts.
4.

Assignment Theory

Closely related to an indemnification theory of undisclosed principals'
liability on authorized contracts is the assignment theory. 54 Like the indemnification theory, the assignment theory of an undisclosed principals' liability on authorized contracts treats third parties' rights to collect from
undisclosed principals not as rights which run directly from undisclosed
principals to third parties, but as rights which derive from the agent's rights
against his principal. Unlike the indemnification theory, however, the assignment theory does not require that the agent suffer an actual loss in order
to create liability for the undisclosed principal.
The assignment theorj views the liability of undisclosed principals to
third parties on contracts which they have authorized their agents to sign
with third parties as based. on the agent's assignment to the third party of
the agent's rights against his principal. The best support for this assignment
theory is found in the agency law rule that payment by the undisclosed
principal to his agent of the amount due to the third party on an authorized
contract before the third party is aware of the undisclosed principal's role
in authorizing the transaction precludes the third party from suing the principal once he is disclosed. !i5 This shows that the third party may not have
S4Hay v. Hollingsworth, 42 Cal. App. 238, 183 P. 582 (1919). See also: Restatement (Second)
ojAgency §303; and Cooper v. Epstein, 308 A.2d 781 at 783 (App. D.C. 1973).
SSPoretta v. Superior Dowel Co., 153 Me. 308, 137 A.2d 361 (1957); Railton v. Hodgson, 4
Taunt. 576 (1804); Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B.C. 78 (1829); Fradley v. Hyland, 37 E 49
(S.D.N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1888); Holmes, supra, note 8 at 19 and cases cited, supra, note 2; and Lewis,
supra, note 7 at 117. The majority view is contrary to that expressed in the Restatement (Second)
ojAgency §208.
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an original right against the principal, but that the third party's rights are
derived from the agent.
If the assignment theory is the proper basis of undisclosed principals'
liability on authorized contracts, the ratification rule for undisclosed principals which is most consistent with it is again one which permits undisclosed principals the power to ratify. As with the case of the indemnification
theory, when the principal ratifies his agent's unauthorized contract, the
principal agrees to be bound by his agent's act and thus creates rights in the
agent against the principal. These rights could then be assigned to the third
party who could proceed directly against the principal.
Again, however, because the assignment theory - like the indemnification theory - is founded on the idea that undisclosed principals are liable
to third parties only because of the principal's obligations to his agent, and
not because of any independent basis ofliability of the undisclosed principal
to the third party, it is limited in its ability to explain all of the rules involving
undisclosed principals. Like the other theories discussed so far, to the extent
it does lend support to a ratification rule for undisclosed principals, it supports one contrary to the present majority view.
5.

Identity Theory

The identity theory was discussed by such early theorists as Holmes,56
Huffcut,57 and Lewis,58 as a possible explanation for holding undisclosed
principals liable on authorized contracts. They suggested that the legal fiction
of equating the identity of the agent and the undisclosed principal shows
that the contract with the third party, although apparently made with the
agent, is actually made with the undisclosed principal. Since the undisclosed
principal is actually the other contracting party, the undisclosed principal
is liable to the third party. Acceptance of the identity theory as the appropriate basis of undisclosed principals' liability on authorized contracts
should lead to the conclusion that undisclosed principals should be able to
be held liable and to enforce unauthorized contracts by ratification. The
explanation for this position would be that when an agent for an undisclosed
principal enters an unauthorized contract, the agent is personally liable to
the third party. 59 Moreover, even if the agent of an undisclosed principal is
S6See infra, notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
S70.W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 232.
s8HujJcut on Agency, supra, note 8 at §161.
s9Lewis, supra, note 7 at 119. See also: Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N.Y. 625, 23 N.E. 24 (1889);
Harris v. McKay, 138 Va. 448, 122 S.E. 137 at 140 (1924); and Geary St., P. & O.R. Co. v.
Rolph, 189 Cal. 59, 207 P. 539 at 543.
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not authorized, the agent can enforce the contract against the third party.60
Therefore, since according to the identity theory the undisclosed principal
and the agent are legally the same person, the undisclosed principal has the
same rights and liabilities of his agent. Because the agent of an undisclosed
principal can enforce and be held liable on an unauthorized contract, this
right and liability also belongs to the undisclosed principal. This fiction then
allows the transfer of rights and liabilities on unauthorized contracts to be
achieved by undisclosed principals through ratification.
But again, although a rule permitting undisclosed principals to ratify
unauthorized contracts would be consistent with the identity theory, the
identity theory cannot be relied upon as the sole basis for the law of undisclosed principals. This is true because there are instances in agency law
where undisclosed principals and their agents are not treated as identical.
There are transactions where agents can enforce a legal right against the
third party, but undisclosed principals cannot. For example, undisclosed
principals cannot enforce authorized contracts against the third party if the
third party entered the contract because of the third party's special trust or
confidence in the agent. 61 The agent, however, can enforce this contract.
Nor can undisclosed principals enforce against the third party any rights
created by agents on negotiable instruments. 62 If the identity theory explained fully the undisclosed principal's relationship with the agent, the rule
for negotiable instruments could not exist or, if it did exist, remain coherent
and consistent with the identity theory. Moreover, the invalidity of the
contract between the third party and the agent such that the agent could
not enforce the contract against the third party or be held liable to the third
party, does not per se invalidate the rights and liabilities on that contract
between the undisclosed principal and the third party.63 If the agent lacked
mental capacity, for example, the third party would still have rights against
the undisclosed principal, and the undisclosed principal would have rights
against the third party.64 Again, the identity theory fails to account for this
rule. Therefore, although the identity theory does support a rule which would
permit undisclosed principals to ratify unauthorized contracts, because of
60See Restatement (Second) ofAgency §§322 and 329; In re Hawaiian Tel. Co., 61 Haw. 572,
608 P.2d 383 at 393 (1980); United States v. Everett Monte Cristo Hotel, Inc., supra, note 4;
and Judith Garden, Inc. v. Mapel, 73 Misc. 2d 810, 342 N.Y.S. 2d 486 at 488 (1973).
61See Restatement (Second) ofAgency §322. See also: Restatement (Second) ofAgency §369;
Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 528 F. Supp. 768 at 776, 793 (D.P.R. 1981);
and Ritchie v. Mundon, 268 Or. 283, 520 P.2d 445 at 447 (1974).
62See authorities cited at supra, note 6, involving personal trust or confidence in agent.
63See authorities cited at supra, note 6, involving negotiable instruments. See also, Seavey,
supra, note 6 at 880 (inability of undisclosed principal to enforce contracts under seal shows
that doctrine of undisclosed principal does not rest upon fiction of identity).
64Weinrib, supra, note 48 at 303.
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the limitations of the identity theory in explaining all instances where undisclosed principals have liabilities and rights on authorized contracts,65 the
identity theory cannot fully be relied upon to resolve the issue. It in no way,
however, supports the present rule.

6.

Change of Position Theory

Lewis also proposed that undisclosed principals' liability on authorized
contracts might be understood as resulting from the role of undisclosed
principals in causing third parties to change their position. 66 Liability is
imposed on the undisclosed principal not because of any deceit by the
undisclosed principal, but because he is the "prime cause"67 of the third
party's change of position. The person responsible for someone's change of
position should be held responsible for any damage created by such a change.
For example, the person responsible for causing the seller of wheat to deliver
it, should be held liable to pay for it.
Unlike the other theories discussed thus far, it is more difficult to decide
which rule of ratification by undisclosed principals is consistent with Lewis'
change of position theory. On the one hand, it could be argued that when
the agent of an undisclosed principal contracts without prior authority from
his principal, the third party's change of position is a result of the agent's
actions, not the undisclosed principal's. Unlike authorized. transactions, the
agent may be viewed as the prime cause of the third party's actions. On the
other hand, even though the agent has acted without authorization, the agent
is still acting on behalf of his principal. Even in the unauthorized transaction,
therefore, the prime cause of the third party's change of position is the person
in control of the agency relationship - the principal. For example, even
though the agent in Keighley, Maxsted agreed to pay more for the wheat
than what he was authorized to pay, the principal should be viewed as the
prime cause of the wheat seller's change of position because he can control
his agent. The principal maintains control over his agent by his right to set
a condition on the agent's employment. If we accept Lewis' change of position theory as a proper basis for the liability of undisclosed principals on
6SIf the fiction of identity between the principal and the agent were to be carried to the
extreme, it could be argued that there would never be any "unauthorized" contracts because
if the principal and the agent are identical, then the agent could never have acted contrary to
the principal's instructions. This is extending the identity theory too far, however. The theory
does not maintain that the principal and agent are actually the same person; it merely attempts
to explain authorized contracts as resulting from the agent representing or standing in for the
principal.
66See Danziger v. Thompson, [1944] K.B. 654, 101 S.l. 440, [1944]2 All E.R. 151, discussed
in Weinrib, supra, note 48 at 301-02. This is further support for the independent liability of
the principal to the third party.
67Lewis, supra, note 7 at 135.
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authorized contracts, either ratification rule for undisclosed principals permitting or denying ratification - could be viewed as consistent with it.
As such, this theory differs from the other theories previously discussed,
since those theories are consistent only with a rule permitting undisclosed
principals the power to ratify.
The change of position theory, however, may not provide a sufficient
explanation of any agency law situation involving undisclosed principals
- whether the issue involves authorized or unauthorized contracts. This
argument flows from the concept of detrimental reliance. To create liability
based on a change of position, reasonable detrimental reliance is required. 68
For example, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel as developed by
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, liability presupposes three factors:
(1) a promise, (2) the promisor, by his promise, should have reasonably
expected to induce action or forbearance by the promisee or third party,
and (3) the promise induces action or forbearance. 69 In the authorized undisclosed principal situation, the undisclosed principal's promise is to the
agent. The third party is induced to change his position by the agent; the
third party is not induced to change his position by the undisclosed principal.
An argument might be made that absent the promise by the undisclosed
principal to his agent, there would be no change of position by the third
party, but the better reasoning is that the change of position must be induced
by the promise from the one to be held liable. Without knowledge of the
promise between the principal and the agent, there can be no reliance on
this promise; therefore, no liability should be imposed.
Consequently, there is a strong possibility that the change of position
theory does not explain the liability of undisclosed principals on even authorized contracts, and is thus an invalid theory upon which to attempt to
base any rules of agency law.70 To the extent it is valid, it appears that a
rule permitting ratification by undisclosed principals is consistent with it,
although a contrary rule may also be consistent with it.
7.

Independent Agency Law Theory

In 1920, Seavey wrote what today is considered the seminal article in
agency law, "The Rationale of Agency".71 In his article, Seavey argued that
undisclosed principals' liability on authorized contracts is not dependent
68See Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781 at 791 n.13 (3d Cir. 1978),
and Restatement (Second) ofAgency §8B.
69Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90.
70See, e.g.: Holmes, supra, note 8 at 19 (ratification has nothing to do with estoppel); Restatement (Second) of Agency §82 comment c (ratification not dependent on estoppel); and
Steffens v. Nelson, 94 Minn. 365, 102 N.W. 871 (1905).
7JSeavey, supra, note 6.
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on any applications of contract, tort, or trust law, but is based on an obligation created by an autonomous body of law, the law of agency.1 2 Undisclosed principals are liable for the contracts which they authorize their agents
to make not because, for example, of any theories of assignment or deceit,
but because principals in general are liable for the contracts which they
authorize their agents to make. It is the principal's status as principal in the
agency relationship which creates liability. This independent agency law
theory ofliability of undisclosed principals is widely accepted today.1 3 This
theory is particularly strong because unlike other theories based on contract
or tort, this theory can resolve agency law issues within one consistent
framework. 74
The independent agency law theory of an undisclosed principal's liability on an authorized contract leads to a ratification rule permitting an
undisclosed principal to ratify unauthorized contracts. Because the principal's liability is based on his status as principal, there is no justification for
distinguishing between undisclosed principal liability in authorized or unauthorized situations followed by ratification. Undisclosed principals are
just as much principals in unauthorized yet ratified agency relationships as
they are in authorized agency relationships. Interestingly, although as Reporter of the Restatement, Seavey assented to the decision that the rule
denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify be included in the Restatement, he later wrote that he believed undisclosed principals should be
able to ratify unauthorized contracts. 75
Unlike the other theories explaining the liability of undisclosed principals on authorized contracts, the independent agency law theory has no
weaknesses. It provides a sui generis basis for liability not based on legal
fictions, torts of deceit, or chains of subrogation. As a result, it is consistent
with the expectations of common business practice. It can account for all
areas of undisclosed principal liability and does not conflict with other
agency law doctrines. As such, it is the best explanation of why undisclosed
principals are liable on authorized contracts. The ratification rule which is
consistent with the independent agency law theory is one which permits
ratification by undisclosed principals. Because of its soundness, the inde72Ibid. at 878. See also: Williamson v. O'Dwyer & Ahern Co., 127 Ark. 530, 192 S.W. 899
(1917).
73See, e.g.: Grinder v. Bryans Rd. Bldg & Supply Co., 290 Md. 687 at 706, 432 A.2d 453 at
461 (1981); M.L. Ferson, "Undisclosed Principals" (1953) 22 U. Cin. L. Rev. 131 at 148;
Weinrib, supra, note 48 at 299; and M.A. Sargent & A. Rochvarg, "A Reexamination of the
Agency Doctrine of Election" (1982) 36 U. Miami L. Rev. 411 at 415-16.
74See infra, note 66.
7sW.A. Seavey, "Ratification - Purporting To Act As Agent" (1954) 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 248
at 248.
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pendent agency law theory provides the strongest basis for the adoption of
a new rule contrary to Keighley, Maxsted and to the Restatement.
8.

Summary

This section has presented seven theories which have been offered by
commentators seeking to understand why undisclosed principals are liable
on authorized contracts. The purpose of this section was to find if any of
these theories concerning authorized contracts leads to a conclusion about
undisclosed principals and their ability to ratify unauthorized contracts. A
ratification rule permitting undisclosed principals to ratify unauthorized
contracts is more consistent with the theories explaining the liability of
undisclosed principals on authorized contracts. Of the seven theories, only
one, the change of position theory, can be seen as lending any support to
the present rule denying ratification rights to undisclosed principals. Even
this support, however, is critically wounded by two points about the change
of position theory: it also supports permitting ratification by undisclosed
principals, and it may be an inappropriate basis for any explanation about
undisclosed principals. The other six theories strongly support a rule permitting undisclosed principals to ratify. These six offer no support for the
present rule. Although some of these theories may be weak in their ability
to account for all of agency law, their weaknesses in no way limit their
usefulness in an analysis of ratification. These weaknesses were identified
merely as a precaution against relying on that theory as the sole basis for
a change in the law. When viewed as a whole, they strongly support the
conclusion that the Keighley, Maxsted rule needs to be revised. Most importantly, the independent agency law theory suffers from none of the weaknesses identified with the other theories, and offers the strongest support
for a rule permitting undisclosed principals to ratify.
The conclusion to this point, therefore, is that for a ratification rule for
undisclosed principals to be consistent with the rules involving the liability
of undisclosed principals on authorized contracts, undisclosed principals
should have the power to ratify unauthorized contracts.

B.

Theories Explaining the Right of Undisclosed Principals to Enforce
Authorized Contracts

The previous section discussed those theories offered by various commentators to explain the liability of undisclosed principals on authorized
contracts in order to determine whether these theories lead to a conclusion
concerning ratification of unauthorized contracts by undisclosed principals.
This section will present and analyze theories which have been offered by
commentators and courts to explain why undisclosed principals can enforce
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a contract against third parties which undisclosed principals authorize their
agents to make. Again, the purpose of this discussion is to see ifany of these
theories involving undisclosed principals' ability to enforce authorized contracts leads to a conclusion concerning ratification of unauthorized contracts
by undisclosed principals.
This section will discuss five theories which have been offered to explain
why undisclosed principals can enforce authorized contracts. These theories
are (1) the reciprocal rights theory, (2) the consideration theory, (3) the trust
theory, (4) the circuitry of action theory, and (5) the assignment theory. This
section, like the one preceding it, will conclude that a new rule which permits
undisclosed principals to ratify unauthorized contracts is more theoretically
sound than the present rule.

1.

Reciprocal Rights Theory

This first theory of undisclosed principal enforcement rights is the corollary of all those theories discussed in Part III which create liability for
undisclosed principals on authorized contracts. The reciprocal rights theory
provides that undisclosed principals can enforce authorized contracts
against third parties because undisclosed principals are liable on these contracts to third parties. The theory is based on notions of fairness and consistency. Justice requires one who is liable on a contract to be able to have
enforcement rights on that contract. 76
Whether this theory of enforcement rights of undisclosed principals
leads to any conclusion regarding ratification for undisclosed principals is
dependent on whether the theories which justify undisclosed principals'
liability on authorized contracts lead to a conclusion about ratification for
unauthorized contracts. As indicated by the previous section's discussion
of the seven theories explaining undisclosed principals' liability on authorized contracts, these theories support permitting undisclosed principals the
power to ratify. Therefore, the conclusion under the reciprocal rights theory
of enforcement should be that undisclosed principals should be' allowed to
ratify unauthorized contracts as well. 77 Thus, the reciprocal rights theory
supports a ratification rule permitting undisclosed principals to ratify.
76Weinrib, supra, note 48 at 298; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Higgins, supra, note
6 at 1151.
77See supra, notes 46-75 and accompanying text.
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Consideration Theory

It has been suggested by one scholar that the ability of undisclosed
principals to enforce authorized contracts is based on the concept of consideration. 78 Even though the third party thought he was dealing only with
the agent, undisclosed principals can sue third parties because the consideration for the transaction comes from the principal. As the provider of the
consideration, undisclosed principals are entitled to receive the benefit from
the one who is the recipient of the consideration.
It is unclear how the consideration theory supports a rule permitting
or denying ratification by undisclosed principals. The issue becomes whether
the undisclosed principal is providing the consideration by ratifying the
unauthorized contract in the same way that the undisclosed principal is seen
as providing the consideration in an authorized transaction. An argument
can be made that the act of ratification is an act by the principal providing
on his part the necessary consideration enabling him to enforce the contract.
If ratification serves this purpose, there seems no distinction between consideration in authorized and unauthorized transactions. On the other hand,
two theories suggest that consideration may not playa role in ratification.
The first is that if consideration is lacking in the original agent-third party
transaction, ratification does not provide the needed consideration. 79 The
second is that no new consideration is needed for a principal to ratify. 80
These two theories seem to suggest that the consideration could only have
come from the agent.
It might be concluded that since consideration is the basis of the right
of undisclosed principals to enforce authorized contracts, but is not the basis
of ratification by partially and fully disclosed principals, denying undisclosed
principals the right to ratify is more consistent with the consideration theory
of undisclosed principal enforcement rights on authorized contracts than
permitting ratification by undisclosed principals. The consideration theory
thus perhaps supports the present rule denying undisclosed principals the
power to ratify. It seems, however, that the consideration theory is actually
no more than the reciprocal rights theory as applied to the benefit-burden
theory of liability since consideration may be analogous to the burden as78BorroIVscale v. Royal BOSlVorth, 99 Mass. 378 at 383 (1868); and Miiller-Freienfels, supra,
note 6 at 304, 306-08. Miiller-Freienfels argues that the consideration theory is supported by
the historical development of the undisclosed principal. The principle of consideration, he
argues, was fully settled at the end of the 17th century, and there are no cases involving .
undisclosed principals before the 18th century: ibid. at 308.
79Restatement (Second) oj Agency §82 comment c. See also: Love 1979 Partners v. Public
Service Comm., 715 S.W.2d 482 at 487 (Mo. 1986); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Smith, 130
S.W.2d 425 at 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
8°/bid.
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sumed or the benefit given by the parties. In other words, undisclosed principals should be able to enforce contracts because they have provided a
benefit (consideration) to the third party. To the extent that the consideration
theory is based on the benefit-burden theory, it is not inconsistent with
permitting ratification by undisclosed principals as discussed in Part III.
3.

Circuitry of Action Theory

Another argument presented as a basis of an undisclosed principal's
ability to enforce authorized contracts lies in the power of an undisclosed
principal to compel the agent to sue the third party, and compel the agent
to pass on the benefits of the transaction to him. It would follow that direct
action by undisclosed principals against third parties should be allowed. 81
When the agent contracts with a third party without disclosing for whom
he is contracting, the agent has the right to enforce the contract against the
third party.82 Because the agent is subject to the control of the principal,83
the principal could order the agent to sue the third party. Rather than requiring this order, the principal should be allowed to sue the third party
directly. Moreover, after the agent successfully sues the third party, the agent
owes a duty to the principal to deliver the benefit of the transaction to the
principal. 84 For example, in a suit for specific performance of delivery of
wheat, the agent would be bound to deliver the wheat to the principal once
the agent received the wheat from the third party. Rather than requiring
the wheat to be delivered to the agent and then delivered to the principal
(or requiring the principal to sue the agent to force the agent to deliver the
wheat to the principal), undisclosed principals are given the right to proceed
directly against third parties. Transaction costs such as attorneys' fees and
court costs are reduced by permitting this direct action. Consequently, there
may be strong efficiency reasons for allowing the principal to enforce rights.
This circuitry of action theory supports permitting undisclosed principals to ratify and thus enforce contracts which were originally unauthorized. This is true for the following reasons. The agent of an undisclosed
principal who has acted without authorization has the right to enforce the
contract against the third party.85 By ratifying, the undisclosed principal is
81Miiller-Freienfels, supra, note 6 at 301; Wright, supra, note 6 at 189 (undisclosed principal's
right to sue third party is a "short cut"); Kelly Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.,
136 A.D. 22, 120 N.Y.S. 163 at 166 (1909).
82Restatement (Second) ojAgency §322.
83Restatement (Second) ojAgency §1(1). See also: Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486,
520 A.2d 717 at 729-30 (1987); and Jones v. Reith, 166 Cal. App. 2d 220,333 P.2d 226 at 231
(1958).
84Restatement (Second) ojAgency §§377, 385(1), 387, 402(1), and 404.
8SSee authorities cited at supra, note 61.
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ordering the agent to enforce the contract. Moreover, because the agent acted
without authorization, the agent may be held accountable to the principal
for breach of duty to act only as authorized. 86 The agent will be relieved of
this breach by the principal's ratification,87 but only if the agent passes on
the benefits to the principal. 88 Therefore, because undisclosed principals are
able to obtain the benefit of the originally unauthorized contract by ordering
their agents to sue the third party or by suing the agent for breach of fiduciary
duty, undisclosed principals should be given the direct right against third
parties by allowing them to ratify. The circuitry of action theory therefore
supports a rule contrary to Keighley, MCL"(sted and the Restatement.
4.

Trust Theory

A theory of enforcement of authorized contracts by undisclosed principals based on the law of trusts was presented by Ames in his 1909 Yale
Law Journal article. 89 Under this trust theory, the undisclosed principal is
the cestui que trust (beneficiary), the agent is the trustee, and the res is the
claim against the third party. The agent-trustee holds legal title to the claim
against the third party, but this claim is actually for the benefit of the undisclosed principal. 9o Application of the trust theory to a ratification rule
for undisclosed principals would again most likely support a rule permitting
undisclosed principals to ratify. Such is the case because the undisclosed
principal is as much the beneficiary of his agent's actions whether the agent
has acted with or without authority. It matters not whether the agent is
acting in an authorized or unauthorized manner, provided that the agent is
still acting as an agent and thus acting on behalf of the principal for the
principal's benefit.
It is not appropriate, however, to evaluate what rule of ratification by
undisclosed principals results from the trust theory because the trust theory
incorrectly explains the relationship between the agent and principal and
. thus should be rejected. 91 A trust relationship is not necessarily an agency
relationship.92 For example, in an agency relationship, the agent is subject
to the principal's contro1. 93 In a trust, the trustee is not subject to the control
of the beneficiary.94 Other differences distinguishing trust from agency in86Restatement (Second) ojAgency §383.
87Ibid. §416.
88See supra, note 84.
89Ames, supra, note 6 at 444.
9OIbid. at 444. See also, Lewis, supra, note 7 at 126-30.
91Seavey, supra, note 6 at 868 n. 29. For further support, see, Miiller-Freienfels, supra, note
6 at 308.

92Restatement (Second) ojAgency §14B.
93Ibid. §1(1).
94Ibid. §14B comment f; and Baron v. Bryant, 556 F. Supp. 531 at 537 (D. Haw. 1983).
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volve the consent of the parties,95 the power to bind the principal,96 and
termination. 97 Therefore, since it is not proper to equate the trust relationship with the agency relationship, a trust theory tends to not be useful in
understanding a ratification rule for undisclosed principals.
5.

Assignment Theory

Another explanation why undisclosed principals can enforce authorized
contracts against third parties is based on the agent's assignment of his claim
against the third party to the principal. 98 In authorized transactions, the
agent of an undisclosed principal has a claim against the third party,99 and
absent special language in the contract,IOO or special circumstances, lOl the
agent can assign his claim to the principal. Proponents of the assignment
theory emphasize the lack of prejudice to the third party in allowing undisclosed principals to sue the third party directly.l02 Although the third
party may not be aware that the agent is acting on behalf of a principal, it
does not matter because generally assignments of contracts to persons unknown to the third party at the time of the contract are permitted. 103 In
fact, an undisclosed principal is less of a "stranger" to the transaction than
assignees in general. I04 The rules of contract law which limit the ability of
a contracting party to assign certain rights under the contract because performance by the assignee would vary materially from the bargained-for
performance lO5 - for example, a contract premised on the artistic skill or
unique ability of the supposed assignor lO6 - are also recognized in agency
law which denies undisclosed principals any right to enforce certain contracts where the third party contracted with the agent because of a special
trust or confidence in the agent. 107 The assignment theory, therefore, is a
useful theory in understanding the enforcement rights of undisclosed prin9SIbid. §14B comment e.
96Ibid. §14B comment g.
97Ibid. §14B comment h.
98Goodhart & Hamson, supra, note 6 at 352; Hay v. Hollingsworth, supra, note 54 at 584.
But see, Muller-Freienfels, supra, note 6 at 314 (assignment theory not proper under English
law although valid under Continental law).
99Restatement (Second) ofAgency §322.
looIbid. §189.
10iSee supra, note 6.
102Goodhart & Hamson, supra, note 6 at 352.
103Ibid. For support, see Seavey, supra, note 6 at 879.
I04MUller-Freienfels, supra, note 6 at 300 (undisclosed principal not in position of complete
stranger).
105Restatement (Second) of Contracts §317(2)(a).
I06See Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 at 247-48 (1866).
107See authorities cited at supra, note 6 involving personal trust or confidence in agent.
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cipals, and in turn towards understanding a rule involving ratification and
undisclosed principals.
The assignment theory supports permitting undisclosed principals to
ratify unauthorized contracts. Although the agent has acted in an unauthorized manner, the agent still has rights against the third party. lOS The
agent could assign his rights to the undisclosed principal. There is no distinction between the agent assigning his rights resulting from the agent's
authorized or unauthorized transactions. The agent has the same rights with
regards to the third party. Therefore, the assignment theory of undisclosed
principals' enforcement rights on authorized contracts supports a rule contrary to Keighley, Maxsted and the Restatement.

6.

Summary

This section has presented five theories which attempt to explain why
undisclosed principals can enforce against third parties contracts which they
authorize their agents to make. The purpose was to find if these theories
concerning authorized contracts would lead to a conclusion about undisclosed principals and their ability to ratify unauthorized contracts. The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that the various theories
which explain the ability of undisclosed principals to enforce authorized
contracts lend more support to a rule permitting undisclosed principals to
ratify than one denying them the power to ratify. The assignment theory,
the circuitry of action theory, and a reciprocal rights theory, in particular
when based on the independent agency law theory of an undisclosed principal's corresponding liability, all strongly support permitting undisclosed
principals to ratify. The trust fund theory also supports such a ratification
rule, but this theory is not appropriate to agency law and should not be
counted as support for any ratification rule. Only the consideration theory
does not clearly point to the adoption of a rule permitting ratification by
undisclosed principals. To the extent that the consideration theory is merely
a component of the benefit-burden theory of liability, however, it does support such a revised rule. This conclusion regarding the enforcement rights
of undisclosed principals adds further strength to the conclusion reached in
the preceding section that the rule established in Keighley, Maxsted and
adopted by the Restatement is not supported by the theories underlying
undisclosed principals' rights and liabilities on authorized contracts.
IOSSee supra, note 61.
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IV. A Ratification Rule for Undisclosed Principals based on Ratification of
Unauthorized Contracts by Disclosed and Partially Disclosed Principals
Another consideration in determining whether the Keighley, Maxsted
decision and Restatement rule should continue to be followed is whether
the rule denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify can be justified
as being consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of ratification by
disclosed and partially disclosed principals. Both the Court of Appeapo9 and
House of Lords llo in Keighley, Maxsted discussed ratification by disclosed
and partially disclosed principals to determine whether permitting undisclosed principals to ratify would be contrary to the general ratification doctrine. The focus of this section will be on whether any of the theories which
underlie ratification by disclosed and partially disclosed principals support
any rule of ratification by undisclosed principals. Eight theories which attempt to explain ratification will be discussed. These eight theories concern
(1) the relation-back concept, (2) the identity of principal and agent, (3) the
principal as commander, (4) the agent-third party transaction as an offer,
(5) the third party's conditional performance, (6) the ratifying principal as
a party to the contract, (7) the agent's secret intentions, and (8) the third
party's expectations. Although the theories involving ratification do not support uniformly one rule involving undisclosed principals and ratification,
these theories do provide greater support for a rule permitting ratification
by undisclosed principals than for one which denies this power to undisclosed principals.

A. Relation-Back Concept
It has been stated that because the principal's ratification relates back
to the time of the agent-third party transaction, ratification is equivalent to
original authorization. I II If ratification is equivalent to original authorization, and undisclosed principals can enforce and be held liable on originally
authorized contracts, this would be strong support for the position that
undisclosed principals should be permitted to ratify unauthorized contracts.
Lord Justice Collins, while sitting on the Court of Appeal in Keighley,
M axsted, relied on this reasoning in his opinion. 112 Support for the relationback concept is found in the rule that the statute of limitations runs from
the time of the agent-third party transaction, not from the time of the principal's ratification. 1I3 The relation-back concept also explains why the law
governing a contract under the doctrine of lex loci contractus is the place
where the agent and third party agreed to the contract, not the place of
I09See supra, notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
IIOSee supra, notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
IIIWambaugh, supra, note 12 at 60; Restatement (Second) ofAgency §100.
112Supra, note 15 at 645.
II30lVen v. King, 130 Tex. 614, III S.W.2d 695 at 698 (1938). See Restatement (Second) of
Agency §lOOA and §82 comment c. See also, Seavey, supra, note 6 at 888.
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ratification. 114 Moreover, if the principal does not have the capacity to enter
the contract at the time of the agent-third party transaction, the principal
cannot ratify the contract after becoming competent. lIS
But again, we must be careful not to place too much emphasis on one theory.
There are instances where the relation-back concept is not followed and
ratification is not viewed as equivalent to original authorization. 116 For
example, no ratification is permitted when there has been a material change
of circumstances before the principal's attempted ratification. 117 If ratification were equivalent to original authorization, ratification would be permitted no matter what has transpired between the time of the agent-third
party transaction and the principal's attempted ratification.
Therefore, although the relation-back concept in general does support
permitting undisclosed principals to ratify, it must be recognized that this
theory does have limits. liS These limits, however, do not support a rule
IJ4Ibid.
Restatement (Second) ofAgency §84.
IJ6Wambaugh, supra, note 12 at 61. If the original contract requires performance to be
complete by a certain date, the contract cannot be ratified after that date. See Restatement
(Second) ofAgency §90. If a fourth party gains rights in the contract after the agent-third party
lIS

transaction, but before the principal's purported ratification, ratification is not permitted. This
is true whether the fourth party did or did not know of the original transaction: Cook v. 1l11lis,
18 Wall. (U.S.) 332 at 338 (1873); See also: Wambaugh, ibid.; Goddard, supra, note 11 at 40.
Before ratification, most jurisdictions in the United States permit the third party to withdraw
and terminate the principal's ability to ratifY: Restatement (Second) of Agency §88. See also:
Wambaugh, ibid.; Seavey, supra, note 6 at 891; Reporter's Notes to Restatement (Second) of
Agency §88, and T.G. Pappas, 'Rescission by Third Party Prior To Principal's Ratification of
Agent's Unauthorized Action" (1948) 2 Vand. L. Rev. 100. In contrast, the English cases do
not permit withdrawal: Bolton Partners v. Lambert (1889), 41 Ch. D. 295, 58 L.J. Ch. 425, 60
L.T. 687. This case, however, is not uncontroversial. See, e.g., Flemingv. Bank ofNew Zealand,
[1900] A.C. 577 at 587, 69 L.J.P.L. 120,83 L.T. 1 (P.C.) (questioned); Dibbins v. Dibbins, [1896]
2 Ch. 348 (distinguished); Watson v. Davies (1930), [1931] 1 Ch. 455, 100 L.J. Ch. 87 (distinguished); WarehOUSing & Fonvarding Co. ofEast Africa Ltdv. JaJJerali & Sons Ltd (1963),[1964]
A.C. 1, [1963] 3 All E.R. 571 (distinguished); Re Portugese Consolidated Copper Mines (1890),
45 Ch. D. 16 (followed); G.H.L. Fridman, The Law ofAgency, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths,
1983) at 86-90 (general support for the rule, but with the observation that its harsh effects are
severely restricted by various limitations); and S.J. Stoljar, The Law ofAgency (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1961) at 189-93 (support for the rule). The Bolton Partners case has been followed
in Canada. See Farrell & Sons v. Poupore Lumber Co., [1935] 4 D.L.R. 783 (S.C. C.) (applied);
and Goodison Thresher Co. v. Doyle (1925),57 O.L.R. 300 (App. Div.) (distinguished).
J17Restatement (Second) ofAgency §89; Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. v. Reyna, 51 Ill. App.
2d 412, 201 N.E.2d 144 at 151 (1964). See also G.H. Robinson, "Ratification After Loss In
Fire Insurance" (1933) 18 Cornell L.Q. 161.
IJ8See also: A.L. Corbin, "Ratification in Agency Without Knowledge of Material Facts"
(1906) 15 Yale L.J. 331 at 332 (knowledge of agent not imputed to principal during ratification
further proof that statement that ratification is equivalent to prior authority is too broad).
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completely denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify; they merely
suggest that other support for the rule permitting ratification is also desirable.

B. Identity Theory
The legal fiction of the identity of the principal and agent (discussed
above in Part III) will also be considered here in deciding whether undisclosed principals should be permitted to ratify their agents' unauthorized
contracts and thus be able to enforce and be held liable on them. Because
under the identity theory, principals have the same rights and liabilities as
their agents, it is important to understand the agent's rights and liabilities
under unauthorized contracts.
1.

Agent's Liability on Unauthorized Contracts

The agent of an undisclosed principal who makes an unauthorized
contract is liable to the third party.1 l9 This liability is based either on the
agent's status as a party to the contract, 120 or perhaps because of some breach
of implied warranty of authority. 121 The agent of a disclosed principal who
has made an unauthorized contract with a third party would also be liable
to the third party unless the agent tells the third party that he is not authorized. The theory of liability, here, is either misrepresentation 122 (if the
agent wrongly tells the third party that he is authorized), or breach of implied
warranty of authority123 (if there is no express misrepresentation but the
agent's conduct reasonably leads the third party to assume that the agent is
authorized). The agent of a partially disclosed principal is also liable on
unauthorized contracts. This liability may be based on the agent's status as
a party to the contract, 124 express misrepresentation,125 or breach of implied
warranty of authority. 126
These rules concerning whether agents are liable on unauthorized contracts indicate that, in general, agents in unauthorized transactions are liable
to third parties with whom they have dealt regardless of whether they act
undisclosed, partially disclosed or disclosed. Absent special circumstances,
when an agent makes a contract with a third party without prior authority
from his principal, the agent will be liable to the third party whether the
119See supra, note 60.
120Restatement (Second) ojAgency §322.
12ISee,e.g., ibid. §329. This section's requirement that the agent purport to contract on behalf
of another seems to be needless.
122Ibid. §330.
123Ibid. §329.
124Ibid. §321.
12sIbid. §330.
126Ibid. §329.
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third party was aware that the agent was acting on behalf of someone else
or not, and whether that someone else had been identified or not.
Applying the identity theory of ratification, it therefore appears that
there is no justification for treating undisclosed principals differently from
disclosed and partially disclosed principals for liability purposes under a
ratification theory. All principals should be able to ratify unauthorized
contracts.
2.

Agent's Ability to Enforce Unauthorized Contracts

Agents who make unauthorized contracts on behalf of disclosed and
partially disclosed principals are not able to enforce these contracts against
third parties. 127 The rationale for this rule is that the agent "cannot prove
the existence of the contract which he purported to make".128 Agents of
undisclosed principals, however, do not fall within the ambit of this rule
because the purported contract is one between the agent and the third party.
Since the third party expected to be bound to the person who is in fact an
agent of an undisclosed principal, the agent of an undisclosed principal can
enforce unauthorized contracts against the third party.
Based on these rules of enforcement, the identity theory of ratification
might lead to the conclusion that undisclosed principals be permitted to
enforce unauthorized contracts through ratification, but that disclosed and
partially disclosed principals should not be able to enforce unauthorized
contracts by ratification. This of course is the very opposite of the present
rule, but one which is consistent with the identity theory.
It should be reiterated, however, that there is a weakness in relying too
heavily on an identity theory. Although there are times when the identity
theory does hold Up,129 the ratifying principal is not always treated as identical to the agent. For example, if the agent has the power to perform a
contract, but the principal does not, the principal cannot ratify the contract. 130 If a third party building contractor signs a contract with an agent
who is a licensed electrician for services which the building code requires
to be performed by only licensed electricians, a principal who is not a licensed electrician can not ratify this contract. If the agent and principal are
identical, this would not be true. Because the identity theory cannot explain
127Ibid. §369.
128Ibid. §369 comment a. This rule is also consistent with giving the third party the right to
withdraw before the principal ratifies. See authorities cited at supra, note 99.
129Dolvin v. American HarrolV Co., 125 Ga. 699, 54 S.E. 706 at 710 (1906) (principal cannot
ratify if agent induced third party into contract fraudulently).
130Restatement (Second) ojAgency §86(1); State v. Thompson, 191 Conn. 360, 464 A.2d 799
at 811 (1983).
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all the rules of ratification, it cannot by itself justify a rule permitting undisclosed principals to ratify. But to the extent it offers some help, it supports
a rule permitting ratification by undisclosed principals.
C. Principal as Commander

It has also been suggested that ratifying principals' liability is based on
control of the agent and that "liability follows control".131 One court wrote
that the "underlying principle upon which liability for ratification attaches
is that he who has commanded is legally responsible for the direct results
and for the natural and probable consequences of his conduct". 132 The fact
that the agent acted without authority does not refute that the principal is
the one in control of the agent. The same court also wrote that it is "immaterial" whether the command is given "before or after the conduct". 133
This "principal as commander" theory of liability of the ratifying principal
does not depend on the principal being disclosed or partially disclosed. There
is no difference between an undisclosed principal's ability to control and
command the agent to operate on his behalf, and the ability of a disclosed
or partially disclosed principal to control and command the agent. Therefore, since the basis of the liability of a ratifying principal under the "principal as commander" theory is the same for all principals, this theory is
more consistent with a rule permitting undisclosed principals to ratify than
one which denies undisclosed principals such a right.

D. Agent-Third Party Transaction As Offer
It was also suggested by Wambaugh in his 1895 Harvard Law Review
article that when the agent acts without authority from his principal, the
agent-third party transaction might be viewed as an offer by the third party
to the principal. 134 This offer theory of ratification finds support in the rule
followed in most American jurisdictions that the third party is permitted
to withdraw from the transaction before the principal has ratified. 135
It is not easy deciding whether this theory leads to any firm conclusion
about ratification and undisclosed principals. It could be argued that the
offer theory might support a ratification rule which treats undisclosed principals differently from disclosed and partially disclosed principals. This is
true for three reasons. First, the third party's agreement with the agent could
be construed only as an offer if the agent tells the third party that he is not
13ISeavey, supra, note 6 at 884.
132Steffens v. Nelson, supra, note 70 at 873.
133/bid. at 873.
134Wambaugh, supra, note 12 at 67.
13SSee authorities cited at supra, note 116.
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authorized but that he will be requesting ratification by his principal. This
scenario is only relevant to disclosed and partially disclosed principals. It
is not relevant to undisclosed principals because if the agent tells the third
party that he must seek ratification from his principal, then the principal
is at least partially disclosed. As a consequence, since an offer analysis can
apply only to disclosed or partially disclosed principals, it might support a
ratification rule which treats undisclosed principals differently. Second, under the offer theory, the third party is expecting that someone else other
than the agent needs to respond to the contract. This can only be true if
the principal has been disclosed either fully or partially. In the undisclosed
principal situation, the third party is not aware of any other step needed
for a complete contract. Third, under the offer theory, the agent has no
enforcement rights against the third party because the third party has not
agreed to a binding contract, but only has made an offer. This is true with
agents of disclosed and partially disclosed principals who have no enforcement rights against the third party. But this is not true for agents of undisclosed principals who can enforce contracts against third parties. 136
Therefore, because the offer theory is consistent with the rules involving
disclosed and partially disclosed principals, but contrary to the rules involving undisclosed principals, it might support denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify unauthorized contracts.
But the offer theory is limited in explaining ratification, and should not
be relied upon too heavily. If the agent-third party transaction is only an
offer, no contract would be formed until the principal communicated his
ratification to the third party. A communication from the principal to the
third party, however, is not required for a valid ratification even in cases
where ratification is permitted. 137 The offer theory is also defeated by the
rule which permits principals to ratify even if the principal has earlier repudiated the transaction. 138 Offers cannot be accepted once they have been
repudiated. 139 If the original contract is only an offer, once repudiated by
the principal it could not be subsequently ratified. Moreover, the relationback concept weakens the argument that the third party has made only an
offer.140 If the agent-third party transaction is only an offer, the contract
136See supra, notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
137Restatement (Second) 0/Agency §95; Wambaugh, supra, note 12 at 67. There is a minority
position which requires the principal to communicate his affirmance to the third party: Dodge
v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686 at 697 (1861); See Wambaugh, supra, note 12 at 64-5; Mechem, supra,
note 10 at 273; and B.R. Brown, "Agency - Ratification and Consent - Should Wisconsin
Follow the Restatement?" (1947) Wis. L. Rev. 394 at 395.
138Restatement (Second) 0/Agency §92(b); Stortroen v. Beneficial Finance Co., 736 P.2d 391
at 398 (Colo. 1987); Reporter's Notes to Restatement (Second) 0/ Agency §88. See also, Restatement (Second) 0/Agency §82 comment c (fresh consent not needed).
139Restatement (Second) o/Contracts §37.
140Seavey, supra, note 6 at 887.
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would be created at the time of acceptance - when the principal ratifies.
But under the relation-back concept (and independent of its ability to support ratification as described above), the contract is seen to be formed at
the time of the agent-third party transaction. 141
The offer theory, therefore, although it has some elements which argue
for a differing treatment of undisclosed principals with regards to ratification, does not accurately describe ratification. It therefore should not be
relied upon as support for a rule denying undisclosed principals the power
to ratify.

E.

Third Party's Conditional Performance

Another suggestion proposed by Wambaugh was that the third party
from the time of the agent-third party transaction has a contract with the
principal but that the third party's obligation to perform the contract is
conditional on the principal ratifying. 142 This characterization of the third
party's obligation to perform supports a rule treating disclosed and partially
disclosed principals differently from undisclosed principals for ratification
purposes. This is so because agents of disclosed and partially disclosed principals cannot enforce against the third party the unauthorized contract they
have negotiated with the third party.143 Because of the agent's inability to
enforce, the third party's obligation to perform is conditional on the principal
ratifying. This does not hold with respect to undisclosed principals because
the agent of an undisclosed principal can enforce the unauthorized contract
against the third party.144 Therefore, the third party's performance is not
dependent on the principal. Using this distinction, this conditional view of
the third party's performance consequently may provide some support for
denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify unauthorized contracts.

E

Ratifying Principal as a Party to the Contract

If a ratifying principal is construed as a party to the contract, this might
support a rule denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify. This is
true because undisclosed principals, unlike disclosed and partially disclosed
principals, are not considered parties to authorized contracts. 145 Because
undisclosed principals are treated differently in terms of whether they are
parties to authorized contracts, it may make sense to treat undisclosed prin141See supra, note 113.
142Wambaugh, supra, note 12 at 67.
143See supra, notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
I44Ibid.
14SRestatement (Second) ofAgency §147. See supra, notes 71-3.
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cipals differently if ratification also involves the principal becoming a party
to the contract.
The only support for the view that a ratifying principal is a party to
the original contract is that a ratification once made cannot be revoked. 146
But there are more and better arguments for the view that the ratifying
principal does not become a party to the contract. First, the ratifying principal need not supply any consideration,147 a requisite for a contract. 148 Nor
does ratification provide consideration if consideration was lacking in the
agent-third party transaction. 149 Second, mutual assent, another requisite
for a contract, 150 is lacking in the ratification situation. 151 Third, ratification
treats the transaction as complete at the time of the agent-third party transaction. 152 This is not the case with a contract which would be considered
complete only at the time of ratification. For these reasons, the ratifying
principal should not be considered a party to the original contract, and this
view does not support a rule denying undisclosed principals the power to
ratify. 153
This analysis reiterates the position taken earlier in the article when
discussing the liability of undisclosed principals on authorized contracts:
the rules of agency law are best understood by recognizing and referring to
an independent body oflaw of agency rather than attempting to fit the rules
of agency law into the law of contracts. Although contract law is helpful in
understanding some aspects of agency, the ratifying principal's liability is
better viewed as based on a non-contractual basis - the law of agency. 154
Contract law cannot be used as an explanation for agency law because the
agency relationship differs from a contractual relationship. An agency relationship is consensual, not contractual. 155 Because the agent in an agency
relationship acts primarily for the benefit of the principal, the agency relationship is a fiduciary one. 156 In a contractual relationship, the parties are
acting for their own benefit and are not fiduciaries of each other. Moreover,
146Haney School-Furniture Co. v. Hightower Baptist Inst., 113 Ga. 289, 38 S.E. 761 (1901).
147See Restatement (Second) 0/Agency, §82 comment c.
148 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law a/Contracts, 3d ed., vol. 1 (Mount Kisco, N.Y.: Baker
Vooris & Co., 1957-1978) §18 (consideration is one requisite of a contract).
149See supra, note 79.
ISOSa/eway Stores, Inc. v. Altman, 296 Md. 486,463 A.2d 829 at 831 (1983); Forbes v. Wells
Beach Casino, Inc, 307 A.2d 210 at 216 (Me. 1973).
ISIFuiton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 289 Ky. 159, 158
S.W.2d 437 at 439 (1942).
IS2See Restatement (Second) a/Agency §82 comment c.
IS3Ibid.
IS4Ibid. §82 comment a (ratification is a legal concept in the law of agency).
IssIbid. §l.
IS6Ibid.

<

1989]

RATIFICATION AND UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPALS

323

someone who lacks the capacity to enter into a contract may have the
capacity to be an agent. IS7 Liability is imposed on the principal because he
is the one that controls the agent and is the one to whom fiduciary obligations
are owed. The basis of the principal's liability is his consent to having
someone act on his behalf. The principal's liability is not necessarily
contractual.
The liability of the ratifYing principal should be explained identically
to the liability of undisclosed principals on authorized contracts - by the
independent agency law theory. RatifYing principals are liable because they
are principals in agency relationships. Their status as principals creates rights
and liabilities. This status is what is important, not the degree of disclosure
made known to third parties. Because disclosure is not a distinguishing
feature in this analysis, all principals should have equal rights and liabilities
under a ratification doctrine. ISS
G. Agent's Secret Intentions

The House of Lords in Keighley, Maxsted expressed the concern that
ratification by undisclosed principals would permit the creation of legal
rights and obligations based on the agent's secret intentions as to on whose
behalf the contract is being made. Permitting the agent's secret intentions
to create rights and obligations, it was argued, is undesirable because it
promotes fraud. ls9 If allowing undisclosed principals the right to ratifY does
increase the likelihood of fraud, this might be a good reason to deny them
a ratification right. But this is not true. The potential for fraud because of
reliance on the agent's secret intentions is not unique to undisclosed principals. The same possibility of fraud arising due to reliance on the agent's
secret intentions exists even with partially disclosed and fully disclosed
principals. For example, it is accepted that partially disclosed principals can
ratifY.16o This means that although the agent must at the time of the transaction with the third party purport or profess to act on behalf of a principal,
the agent is not required to identifY the principal. When the agent makes
a contract without prior authority on behalf of a partially disclosed principal,
the rule is that only the person intended by the agent to be the principal
can ratifY.161 Thus, in the partially disclosed principal situation, the "secret
intention". of the agent, i.e., the identity of the principal, is permitted to be
the basis of legal rights. The potential for fraud is equally possible with the
partially disclosed principal as the undisclosed principal. Because the conIbid. §21.
IS8S ee supra, notes 72-3.
IS9See supra, note 37. See also, Recent Cases (1900) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 153.
I60Restatement (Second) ofAgency §85 comment c.
16lIbid. §§85, 87.
IS7
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cern about the agent's secret intentions does not deny partially disclosed
principals the right to ratify, it should not be sufficient to deny undisclosed
principals the right to ratify. 162 Moreover, the ratification rule which permits
a contract to be ratified even if the "agent" is not acting on someone else's
behalf at the time of the agent-third party transaction, but the agent tells
the third party that he is acting on that person's behalf, 163 has just as much
potential for fraud as permitting undisclosed principals to ratify. Yet this
potential for fraud is not viewed as so hazardous as to justify denying a
power to ratify.
The policy of reducing any possibility of fraud by denying the creation
of contract rights based on the agent's secret intentions cannot justify treating
undisclosed principals differently from partially disclosed or fully disclosed
principals. No meaningful distinction can be drawn between undisclosed
principals and partially or fully disclosed principals on this issue. This alleged policy, therefore, cannot support a rule which denies undisclosed principals the power to ratify unauthorized contracts.

H. Third Party's Expectations
One reason for allowing ratification, it has been argued, is to give the
third party what he expects to get when he agrees to the transaction with
the agent. 164 The third party believes that he is contracting with the agent's
principal, not the agent. Ratification is aimed at correcting a defect in the
agent's authority so that the bargain which the third party intends to make
is the actual bargain he receives. 165 This reasoning supports the Keighley,
Maxsted decision and Restatement position denying an undisclosed principal the right to ratify. Ifratification exists solely to protect the third party's
expectations, the appearance of an undisclosed principal as ratifier is contrary to these expectations and thus should not be permitted. 166
There is support for viewing ratification as existing to protect the third
party's expectations. For example, under present law, it is accepted that if
a third party enters a contract with someone who is not the agent of anyone,
if this someone (the alleged agent) purports to the third person to be acting
on behalf of another person (the alleged principal), the contract can be
162See Goddard, supra, note II at 44-5.
163Restatement (Second) ofAgency §85 comment d. See also Linn v. Kendall, 213 la. 33, 238
N.W. 547 at 548 (1931).
164Ibid. §85 comment a. See also J.A.C. Hetherington, "Trends in Enterprise Liability: Law
and the Unauthorized Agent" (1966) 19 Stan. L. Rev. 76 at Ill.

16sIbid.
166See Seavey, supra, note 6 at 887 (law should seek to satisfy the reasonable expectations
of persons).
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ratified. 167 By ratifying the contract, the "principal" creates an agency relationship. Ratification is allowed under this circumstance in order to protect the expectations of the third party.
The problem with relying on this type of analysis in order to support
denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify is that when dealing with
authorized contracts, the expectations of the third party are not considered
relevant. Although it must be conceded that the appearance of a ratifying
undisclosed principal distorts the expectations of the third party, this distortion is not different following ratification of an unauthorized contract
than the distortion experienced by the appearance of an undisclosed principal after an authorized transaction. When an undisclosed principal enforces an authorized contract, the third party's expectations are defeated
since the third party never expected enforcement by anyone other than the
agent. Yet, undisclosed principals can enforce authorized contracts. Therefore, although the policy of seeking to protect the third party's expectations
does lend support to a rule denying undisclosed principals the power to
ratify unauthorized contracts, this same policy is not considered significant
when dealing with authorized contracts. There is no justification for protecting third party expectations in unauthorized transactions but not protecting them in authorized transaction. Whether the agent has been
authorized is a matter between the principal and the agent. The third party
has no role in the issue of the agent's actual (express or implied) authority.
If the third party's expectations are to be a consideration for agency law
doctrine, these expectations should be accorded equal dignity in all situations. The third party's expectations should not be seen, therefore, as a
stumbling block to permitting ratification by undisclosed principals.
1.

Summary

This section has discussed eight theories which attempt to explain ratification of unauthorized contracts by disclosed and partially disclosed principals. The purpose of this section was to find if the ratification theories
concerning disclosed and partially disclosed principals lead to a conclusion
about ratification and undisclosed principals. As the discussion has indicated, five theories favour permitting undisclosed principals to. ratify: relation-back concept, identity of principal and agent, principal as
commander, ratifying principal as a party to the contract, and the agent's
secret intentions. Three theories lend support to denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify: agent-third party transaction as offer, third party's
conditional performance, and third party's expectations.
161See supra, note 163.
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Although it is difficult to precisely and qualitatively assess which ratification rule for undisclosed principals is better supported by the theories
explaining ratification of disclosed and partially disclosed principals - and
it would be disingenuous to use merely a quantitative approach - the
conclusion appears to be that a rule permitting undisclosed principals to
ratifY is more consistent with the theories explaining ratification by disclosed
and partially disclosed principals than one denying undisclosed principals
the right to ratifY. Of the three theories which support denying undisclosed
principals the right to ratifY, two have significant weaknesses. As discussed
above, the offer theory conflicts with three rules of ratification - that the
principal need not communicate his ratification to the third party; that the
principal can ratifY even if he has repudiated earlier the contract; and that
the date of formation of the contract, not ratification, is the time when the
contract came into being (the relation-back concept).168 Moreover, basing
a ratification rule for undisclosed principals upon the third party's expectations conflicts with the lack of significance given to the third party's expectations in authorized undisclosed principal situations. 169 These two
theories, therefore, are not strong bases to support the present ratification
rule for undisclosed principals. The only theory which supports denying
undisclosed principals the right to ratifY which is not flawed is the one which
views the third party's performance as conditional upon ratification. But
this theory appears to be more of a deduction from the rule which denies
undisclosed principals the right to ratifY than a theoretical foundation for
such a rule.
The ratification theories which support permitting undisclosed principals to ratifY do not have the problems which their competing theories
present. They also appear more consistent with those theories discussed
earlier in this article concerning undisclosed principals and authorized contracts. Although the matter is not as clear as it was when discussing the
theories involving undisclosed principals' rights and liabilities on authorized
contracts (clearly supporting a rule permitting undisclosed principals the
right to ratifY), it nevertheless appears that the theories explaining ratification by disclosed and partially disclosed principals do not justify the differing treatment of undisclosed principals, but instead tend to support a
rule permitting undisclosed principals the right to ratifY.
V.

Other Considerations in Determining a Rule of Ratification for
Undisclosed Principals

This article has discussed the theories which explain (1) the liability of
undisclosed principals on authorized contracts, (2) the right of undisclosed
principals to enforce authorized contracts against third parties, and (3) rat168See supra, notes 137-41 and accompanying discussion.
169See supra, discussion in text following note 167.
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ification by disclosed and partially disclosed principals. Analysis of these
theories indicate that they better support a rule which permits undisclosed
principals to ratify unauthorized contracts made on their behalf by their
agents than the rule established in Keighley, Maxsted and adopted by the
Restatement. Denying undisclosed principals the power to ratify unauthorized contracts is inconsistent with the well-established rules that permit
undisclosed principals to enforce and be held liable on authorized contracts.
Moreover, the theories which attempt to explain ratification do not support
treating undisclosed principals differently from disclosed or partially disclosed principals with regards to the ability of principals to ratify. Therefore,
if the rule which denies undisclosed principals the power to ratify is supportable and deserves continued acceptance, it must be on some other basis
than the theoretical underpinnings of the law involving undisclosed principals and the law of ratification.
This section will discuss three possible bases of support for the rule
denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify unauthorized contracts.
These three bases are (1) a policy that undisclosed principals should be
discouraged, (2) a policy that ratification should be discouraged, and (3) the
state of authority. Analysis of each argument again will show, however, that
none justify the continued acceptance of the Keighley, M axsted decision and
Restatement position.
A.

Undisclosed Principals should be Discouraged

One possible justification for denying undisclosed principals the right
to ratify unauthorized contracts might be a desire to limit the use of the
device of the undisclosed principal. If undisclosed principals are treated
equally with disclosed and partially disclosed principals, principals have no
incentive not to operate undisclosed. Only by treating undisclosed principals
less favourably than other principals will persons agree to have their agents
identify them to third parties in order to avoid the less favourable treatment.
One area where undisclosed principals can be treated less favourably is the
ability to ratify.
There is some justification for the position that undisclosed principals
should be treated unfavourably. Commentators have described the undisclosed principal as a "device of dubious social utility"PO "a cloak to perpetuate outright fraud"171 and "inimical to market functioning and business
planning".172 Undisclosed principals have also been criticized for "signifi170M.H. Merrill, "Election Between Agent and Undisclosed Principal: Shall We Follow The
Restatement?" (1933) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 100 at 129.

17lIbid.
I72Hetherington, supra, note 164 at 112.
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cantly infringing" on the rights of third parties to select those with whom
they deal,173 and for destroying third parties' reasonable expectations. 174 If
these criticisms are accepted, one reason therefore for denying undisclosed
principals the right to ratify and be able to enforce unauthorized contracts
against third parties is to punish persons for being undisclosed principals. 17s
By doing so, conducting business as an undisclosed principal will be
discouraged.
A closer inspection of these arguments, however, indicates little or no
harm results from allowing the existence of undisclosed principals. Therefore, principals should not be punished for acting undisclosed. This is true
for at least four reasons. First, from the third party's perspective, in the vast
majority of contracts, it makes no difference whether there is an undisclosed
principaI.176 It makes no difference to the wheat farmer whether the wheat
is sold to Roberts or to Keighley, Maxsted & Co.. Second, undisclosed
principals are so commonly used that the third party must be considered
to have contemplated at least the possibility that he is dealing with an agent
of an undisclosed principal. l77 Ifit does make a difference to the third party
whether the other contracting party is only an agent, the third party can
easily protect himself against the existence of an undisclosed principal either
by asking about the existence of any principal 17s or by drafting a clause
which excludes undisclosed principals. 179 Because the third party can so
easily protect himself against the existence of undisclosed principals, the
third party's failure to do so is best explained by the absence of any prejudice
to the third party. ISO Third, the third party is not in a worse position because
of the appearance of an undisclosed principal. The third party is bound to
perform the contract only once. Performance is owed either to the agent or
the principal. lSI Moreover, the third party can raise any defenses that he
has against the agent in an action brought by the principal. 1S2 The third
party even may be in a better position because now not only does he have
the right to enforce the contract against the agent, but he also has enforcement rights against the principal. 1S3
173Ibid.
174Ibid. at 111.
175Ibid.
176Wright, supra, note 6 at 185-86.
171Note, "Personal Prejudice and the Doctrine of the Undisclosed Principal", supra, note 6.
178See Restatement (Second) ojAgency §§302, 304.
179See ibid. §§302, 303.
IS0See Wright, supra, note 6 at 185.
ISISee Restatement (Second) ojAgency §31O comment c.
IS2Wright, supra, note 6 at 188; Goodhart & Hamson, supra, note 6 at 322; Frazierv. Poindexter, 78 Ark. 241, 95 S.W. 464 at 466 (1906).
IS3See Miiller-Freienfels, supra, note 6 at 313 ("unexpected godsend").
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Finally, there are reasons why undisclosed principals rather than being
"inimical to market functioning" are in fact positive forces in achieving an
efficient system of contract law. First, undisclosed principals may be more
useful than other principals in facilitating transactions that lead to more
efficient economic use of goodS. 184 For example, if a real estate developer
seeks to purchase ten small vacant lots from their owners in order to build
a shopping centre, the transfer of the lots may be facilitated by the real
estate developer remaining undisclosed. This is true because if the lot owners
know that the buyer is a real estate developer, they may attempt to "hold
out" for a price higher than that which they would have been satisfied to
receive had they not known the identity of the buyer. If each lot owner
stubbornly holds out and attempts to receive a disproportionate share of
the increase in land value from the building of the shopping centre, it may
become uneconomical to build the shopping centre and the entire deal will
collapse. Second, knowledge of the identity of the buyer might also lead to
more transaction costs. For example, appraisal and legal fees may increase
in order for both sides to calculate and negotiate the value of the properties
if the sellers know that it will be used for a shopping centre. If undisclosed
principals do facilitate transactions at lower costs, there is no reason to
adopt rules of law which discourage persons from acting undisclosed.1 85
The policy that principals should not be punished for remaining undisclosed, and treated more poorly than disclosed and partially disclosed
principals, is evidenced in other areas of agency law. For the most part, the
rules of agency law do not change depending on whether the principal is
disclosed, partially disclosed or undisclosed.1 86 Where there is a difference
in the law depending upon whether the principal is undisclosed, the undisclosed principal, although sometimes denied certain rights granted to other
principals,187 sometimes receives more favourable treatment than other

184See Wright, supra, note 6 at 184.
18SAn argument might be made that undisclosed principal transactions create uncertainty in
the bargaining process, and that this uncertainty might lead third parties to be less willing to
engage in transactions. In other words, even though the third party is not told by the agent
that he is acting on behalf of a principal, the third party nevertheless knows that undisclosed
principals are common and that one may exist. In order to protect himself against this possibility, the third party may increase the price for his bargain in order to cover any possible
additional risk posed by a potential undisclosed principal. If the cost of this risk is too high
or uncertain, the third party might not contract at all. The response to this argument is that
the more likely behavior by the third party is not to drop out of the market, but to ask the
agent whether he is acting on behalf of a principal, or to include in the contract a clause
excluding enforcement by any undisclosed principal.
186See authorities cited at supra, note 5 (all principals regardless of amount of disclosure can
enforce authorized contracts).
187See authorities cited at supra, note 6.
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principals. 188 Therefore, denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify
cannot be justified as necessary to sustain a consistent policy of unfavourable
treatment of undisclosed principals. Quite simply, no such policy exists. 189
Even if there was a justifiable policy of unfavourable treatment of undisclosed principals in agency law, ratification would not be the proper place
to implement it. Ratification involves situations where the agent has acted
in an unauthorized manner. Undisclosed principals gain no advantage when
their agents act contrary to their instructions. Moreover, the blanket rule
denying undisclosed principals any right to ratify can not support a policy
of unfavourable treatment of undisclosed principals because it shields undisclosed principals from liability arising out of a purported ratification.
While a rule imposing liability on undisclosed principals based on ratification, but denying any enforcement rights against third parties, might be
used to support a policy of discouraging principals from acting undisclosed,
the Keighley, Maxsted decision and Restatement position, by protecting
undisclosed principals from liability, does not further such a policy. In fact,
the rule does quite the opposite. By denying ratification to undisclosed
principals, the rule at times will serve to protect the undisclosed principal
from liability, and consequently works contrary to the policy by eliminating
for the principal a disincentive to remaining undisclosed.
The important point is that the rule denying undisclosed principals the
power to ratify unauthorized contracts made on their behalf by their agents
cannot be justified by a policy of discouraging principals from acting undisclosed. No such policy exists, and even ifit did, it would not be furthered
by a rule denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify.
188Under the agency doctrine of election, a third party suing an undisclosed principal and
his agent must elect to take judgment against one. Judgment against the agent releases the
undisclosed principal from liability: Restatement (Second) ojAgency §21O. On the other hand,
entry of judgment against the agent of a partially disclosed principal does not discharge the
principal: Restatement (Second) ojAgency §184(1). See generally, M.A. Sargent & A. Rochvarg,
"A Reexamination of the Agency Doctrine of Election", supra, note 73. Moreover, the rule
followed in most jurisdictions is that if the undisclosed principal makes payment to his agent,
the undisclosed principal is released from liability to the third party: PoreUa v. Superior Dowel
Co., supra, note 55; Holmes, supra, note 8 at 19; Lewis, supra, note 7 at 117; and MiillerFreienfels, supra, note 6 at 313. But see, Restatement (Second) ojAgency §208. Payment by a
disclosed or partially disclosed principal to his agent does not discharge the principal's liability
to the third party: Restatement (Second) ojAgency §183.
189Miiller-Freienfels writes that Continental jurisprudence "esteems the institution of undisclosed principal very highly": supra, note 6 at 300. He also points out that neo-Babylonian
cuniform law and Jewish law according to the law of the Babylonian Talmud recognizes rights
of undisclosed principals: ibid. at 312.
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B. Ratification should Be Discouraged

Perhaps a rule denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify might
be justified on the basis that ratification in general should be discouraged,
because it is unfair to third parties and is contrary to commercial needs. A
rule denying undisclosed principals the right to ratify might be viewed as
one step in the direction of reducing the use of ratification. Ratification,
however, is not unfair on third parties and is useful to commerce, and
therefore should not be discouraged. Since there is no need to discourage
ratification, this policy cannot support a rule denying undisclosed principals
the right to ratify.
1.

Unfairness to Third Parties

Comment d to Section 82 of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency notes
that ratification "at times" may operate unfairly because it gives the principal "an election to blow hot or cold upon a transaction" .190 If after learning
of the transaction, the principal decides that the contract is good for him,
he will ratify. If the contract is not to his advantage, the principal is not
bound and will not ratify.
But this does not establish the unfairness of ratification. First, the principal's right to "blow hot or cold" is merely giving the principal the right
which he would have had if the agent had discussed the contract with him
before the agent contracted with the third party. The principal is not getting
an additional right, but merely the same right at a later time. Any potential
unfairness that might result because of the principal's ability to access the
contract at this later time is accounted for and militated against by the rule
which denies the principal the power to ratify if there has been a material
change in circumstances between the time of the agent-third party transaction and the principal's purported ratification thereby making ratification
inequitable. 191 Moreover, the third party is protected from unfairness, according to a majority of jurisdictions in the United States, because during
the time before the principal ratifies, the third party is permitted to withdraw. 192 This American rule gives the third party an unexpected additional
right which he would not have had if the contract had been authorized. The
third party thought he was bound to a contract, but now the third party is
given the right to back out without any liability. Even under the English
and Canadian approach, which denies the right of withdrawal to the third
190Restatement (Second) of Agency §82 comment d. See also: Bradley v. John M. Brabham
Agency, Inc. 463 E Supp. 27 (D.S.C. 1978); Cooke v. Orsen, 12 M.J. 335 (1982); and Fulka v.
Florida Commercial Banks, Inc., 371 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1979).
1915ee supra, note 117.
1925ee supra, note 116.
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party pending ratification,193 an approach called "wrong" by SeaveY,194 ratification should not be seen as unfair to the third party. The English rule
merely denies the bonus which the American rule provides; it does not take
away any right from the third party. The third party, therefore, is not in a
worse position than if ratification did not exist. The lack of unfairness is
underscored in the situation of an undisclosed principal's ratification because the third party, even if not allowed to withdraw, is being held only
to the deal to which he originally agreed - a contract with the agent. 195
The third party is not treated unfairly by ratification because if the third
party does not withdraw, or does not have the power to withdraw, the third
party has a cause of action against the agent. 196 The third party would only
not have a claim against the agent if the agent tells the third party that he
is not authorized, and plans to seek ratification from his principal. But this
circumstance should not be seen as unfair to the third party because the
third party knowingly has agreed to take the risk that the principal will
ratify. Interestingly, this last situation would not involve undisclosed prin193BoitOll Partners v. Lambert, supra, note 116.
1945eavey, supra, note 6 at 891:
It creates an offer [by the third party] when none was intended and imposes upon
a mistaken party [the third party] an obligation not imposed upon an offeror. The
English court creates before ratification ... a one-sided obligation created elsewhere
only where it has been paid for, where protection is afforded to a dependent class,
or where there is fraud.
19sThis is true even under the most extreme circumstances. For example, without the ability
of the third party to withdraw pending ratification, under some scenarios there might be a
strong argument that they are unfairly disadvantaged. The argument would be premised on
the fact that the undisclosed principal is presented later with an option to accept or reject the
contract on the terms of the deal which were negotiated sometime before. The third party, on
the other hand, would be bound at the time the agent makes the deal. In the meantime, market
fluctuations may have made the deal more attractive (in which case the principal will choose
to ratifY) or less attractive (in which case the principal will choose to reject). Assuming this
market fluctuation was not tantamount to a material change in circumstances, since fluctuating
markets are a business reality, if the principal were to reject the deal, then he could not be
held liable on the contract. The third party would then have recourse against the agent: supra,
notes 119-26. The "unfairness" would arise if the agent is unable to pay the price. The third
party then would be able to recover from neither the principal nor the agent. Therefore, the
third party is at a disadvantage because he runs the risk of losing under the contract and
changed market conditions, but has no reciprocal opportunity to benefit from them: he can
lose but never win. The weakness with this argument is clearly that the third party is in no
worse a position than he originally (and ostensibly) contracted for, since by all indications he
was contracting with the agent alone. Consequently, from the third party's perspective, if the
agent is unable to pay, the situation would be no different than any other contractual situation
where the other party may be insolvent. In other words, there is no link between the principal's
"option" and the potential disadvantage to the third party because the potential benefit of the
option does not come at the expense of "unfairness" to the third party. They are independent
of each other.
1965ee supra, notes 119-26.
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cipals (if they are allowed to ratify) because by disclosing his lack of authority, the agent is creating at the least a partially disclosed principal. It
could be argued, therefore, that ratification by undisclosed principals has
the least potential for unfairness in that the agent is always liable to the
third party.
There is also the argument that ratification not only is not unfair to
third parties, but that it gives the third party an advantage over the principal.
A principal deciding whether to ratify a contract already agreed to by his
agent may ratify a contract less advantageous to him than what he might
have been able to bargain for earlier in order for the principal to protect
his business reputation. 197 Rather than have it become known that the principal's agents are "loose cannons" and have acted unauthorized, the principal may ratify a contract which is less desirable than one which might
have been negotiated earlier. Moreover, a principal may ratify a contract
even though he could have earlier negotiated a better one in order to avoid
defending a lawsuit. 198 The rule which requires that the contract be ratified
in its entirety, exactly as agreed upon by the agent and third party,199 also
indicates that the principal may be forced to agree to a less advantageous
contract by ratification than if the original transaction had been made with
his full knowledge and authorization. For all these reasons, ratification does
not treat the third party unfairly.2oo
2.

Commercial Usefulness

There is also no justification for discouraging the use of ratification
because it is contrary to the needs of commerce. 201 In fact, the opposite is
true - ratification is beneficial to commerce. As written in comment d to
Section 82 of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency:
[P]erhaps the best defense of ratification is pragmatic; that it is needed in the
prosecution of business. It operates normally to cure minor defects in an agent's
authority, minimizing technical defenses and preventing unnecessary lawsuits.
1975ee Restatement (Second) ofAgency §82 comment d.
198Ibid.
199Ibid. §96; See also: United States ex. reI. Trane Co. v. Raymar Contracting Corp., 295 F.
Supp. 234 at 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
975 (1969); C.Q. Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 363 So.2d 379 at 382 (fl. 1978); and Land Title
Co. of Dallas v. F.M. Stigler, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 754 at 758 (Tex. 1980).
200See Wambaugh, supra, note 12 at 62; Seavey, supra, note 6 at 891; and Holmes, supra,
note 8 at 19.
20lSee Goddard, supra, note 11 at 45 (ultimate limitation of ratification should be determined
by the convenience and necessities of business). See also: Wright, supra, note 6 at 184 (test to
be applied should be that of business man's reasonable needs); and Miiller-Freienfels, supra,
note 6 at 309 (agency law has commercial slant because of the reception of the Law Merchant
by the Common Law).
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In this aspect, it is a beneficial doctrine, which has been adopted in most
systems of law. 202

Ratification's role in reducing litigation not only reduces the transaction
costs of doing business, but also serves society's need for reducing the burden
on the court system. In "The Rationale of Agency", Seavey wrote that
although it was "difficult to assign a logical place"203 to ratification, it "conforms to our needs"204 and "serves our convenience".205
In conclusion, therefore, ratification is not unfair to third parties and
is beneficial to commerce and society.206 Its use need not be discouraged.
Any argument that permitting undisclosed principals to ratify is unwise
because it would be expanding an unfair and damaging ratification doctrine
must be rejected.
C. State of Authority
One last possible justification for continuing to accept the rule that
undisclosed principals do not have the power to ratify contracts is its widespread acceptance. Although there may have been room for debate as to
what was the state of the authorities at the time of the Keighley, Maxsted
decision,207 it is clear that today the overwhelming authority208 is that undisclosed principals cannot ratify unauthorized contracts even if their agents
make the contract on their behalf Because consistency in the law is important for predictability and the ability for business to assess risks, the
widespread acceptance of a rule may justify its continued acceptance. But
this may not be true with the rule involving undisclosed principals and
ratification. Courts do not feel constrained to follow precedent, even if a
question is long settled, when the case involves a matter where parties have
not placed reliance. 209 The rule against permitting undisclosed principals
the right to ratify is not one on which parties rely in structuring their business
dealings. Ratification involves only unauthorized transactions, and while
unauthorized behaviour i~. not beyond the foreseeable risks involved in
doing business through ag~nts, business does not rely on such behaviour.
Moreover, because the current rule is inconsistent with the rules involving
202Restatement (Second) ofAgency §82 comment d.
203Supra, note 6 at 887.
204Ibid.
2osIbid. at 888.
206See Seavey, "Ratification - Purporting to Act as Agent", supra, note 75 at 250 (ratification
is a beneficient doctrine); and Strader v. Haley, 216 Minn. 315, 12 N.W.2d 608 at 613 (1943)
(ratification is based on universally accepted principles of justice).
207See Goddard, supra, note 11.
208See supra, notes 41-4.
209Looman Realty Corp. v. Broad St. Nat'[ Bank, 32 N.J. 461,161 A.2d 247 at 254 (1960).
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undisclosed principals and authorized contracts210 and the rules involving
ratification by disclosed and partially disclosed principals,211 allowing ratification by undisclosed principals in fact might be more consistent with
business' present reliance (if any reliance exists on such issues).212
VI. Conclusion
Seavey once wrote that the House of Lords in Keighley, Maxsted"added
the 'anomaly' of undisclosed principals to the 'anomaly' of ratification and
got zero".213 The better characterization of the Keighley, Maxsted decision
is that it created its own anomaly.214 There is no reason to permit undisclosed principals the right to enforce and be held liable on authorized contracts, but not to be able to enforce and be held liable on unauthorized
contracts through ratification. Nor is there any reason to permit disclosed
and partially disclosed principals to enforce and be held liable on unauthorized contracts through ratification but not to allow undisclosed principals this power. Unless undisclosed principals are denied rights and
liability on authorized contracts, and unless ratification is denied for all
principals, a rule which denies undisclosed principals the power to ratify
unauthorized contracts which their agents make on their behalf should not
be followed. Although courts may be reluctant to change a rule which is
widely accepted, in light of the arguments presented in this article, the courts
as well as legislatures and Restatement drafters should consider adopting a
rule permitting undisclosed principals the power to ratify.

210See supra, discussion in Part III.
211See supra, discussion in Part IV.
212See Looman Realty Corp. v. Broad St. Nat'l Bank, supra, note 208 at 254 (rules which
lead to enigmatic anomalies may welI intrigue the scholar and adorn his treatises, but serve
only to baffle businessmen).
213Seavey, "Ratification - Purporting to Act as Agent", supra, note 75 at 250 n.16.
214See MiilIer-Freienfels, supra, note 6 at 315; See also Goodhart & Hamson, supra, note 6
at 325-26.

